

CURRENT *History*

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OCTOBER 1965

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CURRENT History

OCTOBER, 1965

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In this issue, Current History offers its first review of the U.S.S.R. since the new regime, under the collective leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, assumed control in October, 1964. Here, six specialists analyze the regime, its policies and its potential—both at home and abroad.

Cults, Coups and Collective Leaderships

By HOWARD R. SWEARER

*Associate Professor, Political Science Department
University of California at Los Angeles*

. . . The more enterprising the man,
The quicker wells up in him
The desire for unchecked power
And to have his own way in everything.
The rapids of flattery carry him
Right into the swamp of arrogance.
In him flattery and arrogance choke up
The springs of Bolshevik honor
And the well of Party modesty.

Was it so long ago that the nation's peoples
Stigmatized the foul morals
Created by the cult
And so disastrous for the state?
The 20th Party Congress exposed

Both the cult and all its practices.
We expended great effort
To destroy its remnants.

Life provided us with such a lesson
That supposedly no Pakhomov big or small
Could again arise in any executive committee.
But what is this? We again find in places
His habits, morals, and regime.
You see, we forgot
To erect barriers against them.
After all, we soon again heard
Ringing from the tribunes of meetings
The expressions "at the head" and "personally" . . .
(*Krokodil*, No. 1, 1965)

Such were the literary epitaphs for Nikita Khrushchev on October 14, 1964, after a decade during which he had dominated the Soviet political scene. Retired in disgrace to his dacha outside Moscow, the former party first secretary and premier must have pondered the sudden shift of fortune to which Soviet political leaders are subject. Hearing himself criticized as a leader who "besides conducting tried to play all the instruments himself" and watching his works being withdrawn from sale and history being rewritten

to exorcise his role, he may well have recalled the epigram which swept the Soviet Union after he had denigrated Stalin: "For communists the future is known but the past is always changing."

The Russian people, in turn, must have again been bemused by the brand of politics which has required the denunciation of every major political leader in Soviet history, save Lenin. Finally, reminiscent of the post-Stalin period, Khrushchev's successors have thus far wrapped themselves in the flag of "collective

leadership" and have trumpeted the primacy of the party as a collective governing body. No single leader has yet thrust himself forward in the Leninist-Stalinist-Khrushchevist tradition.

THE ISSUE OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION

Western authorities disagree at several points over the meaning of Khrushchev's ouster for, to the outsider, the entire story remains untold.¹ Nevertheless, a brief review of the issues, actors, and institutions involved in this unprecedented event is vital for an appreciation of the configuration of political forces and the policy orientations of the post-Khrushchev regime. If Khrushchev's ouster represented a major rebellion by a cohesive, ideological opposition against his programs and lieutenants, as well as his methods, then one would have expected a fairly rapid repudiation of "Khrushchevism" and a widespread purge of his followers. On the other hand, if he was deposed by his own lieutenants in a palace revolt against him personally, the outcome would more probably have been criticism of his personality and methods but considerable continuity in policies and only moderate alterations in the composition of the leadership.

Events during the nine months since Khrushchev's overthrow tend to support the second interpretation. A majority of the members of the new party Presidium had been closely associated with Khrushchev and had appeared to owe their positions to his patronage: Khrushchev's old Ukrainian organization is still strongly represented in the leadership. The new first secretary, L. I. Brezhnev, had been groomed by Khrushchev as his

second-in-command and probable successor (of course the latter had different timing in mind). In high places, personnel alteration with political overtones have been selective and relatively limited. Although the new leadership has modified several of Khrushchev's policies—especially in agriculture and party organization—his ouster did not touch off dramatic policy initiatives. Not only have many of the programs forged during Khrushchev's tenure survived his departure, but, in addition, long-standing policy disagreement about resource allocation, industrial administration and other matters have continued unabated, thereby suggesting that neither a conservative nor a liberal bloc won a clear-cut victory.

The fact that Khrushchev was peacefully deposed and, at least on the surface, deposed in accord with established procedures—by resolutions of the party Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet—might suggest a first glance that the issue of transferring political leadership has been resolved. Although a step in the direction of regularization of political succession may have been taken last October, a closer look casts doubt that this serious problem, which has plagued the Soviet system from its inception, has really been overcome. There is still a yawning gap between formal constitutional and legal provisions purporting to regulate the formation and operation of political leadership and the actual means by which political leaders achieve power.²

Beneath the superficial trappings of legal procedure, it is clear that Khrushchev was in fact removed in a surprise, conspiratorial move by his Presidium colleagues. The Presidium moved against Khrushchev while he was vacationing on the Black Sea. The coup had obviously been carefully planned: it occurred when several key members of Khrushchev's personal entourage were away from Moscow and the secret police were neutralized, most probably by party secretary A. N. Shelepin. Thus, the actions of the Presidium were unknown to Khrushchev until his opponent was prepared to summon him to Moscow and present him with a *fait accompli*. An

¹ See Merle Fainsod, Richard Lowenthal, and Robert Conquest, "The Coup and After," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February, 1965), pp. 1-21; Carl Linden, Adam Ulam, Leon Smolinski, T. H. Rigby, and J. W. Cleary, "The Coup and After: II," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3 (May-June, 1965), pp. 37-49; Peter Reddaway, "The Fall of Khrushchev," *Survey*, No. 56 (July, 1965), pp. 11-30.

² For a general discussion of the issue of succession in the U.S.S.R., see Myron Rush, *Political Succession in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); Howard R. Swearer, "After Khrushchev: What Next?," *Current History*, No. 279 (November, 1964), pp. 257-65.

anticipating that Khrushchev would attempt to appeal the action of the Presidium to the larger party Central Committee, as he had done in June, 1957, when threatened by the "anti-party group," his Presidium opponents took the precaution of lining up support beforehand in that body. Significantly, unlike June, 1957, it was the Presidium opposition, rather than Khrushchev, who called the Central Committee into session. By the time Khrushchev had returned to Moscow the die had been cast and his endeavors to rally the Central Committee on his behalf proved fruitless as his former supporters swiftly shifted their loyalties to the winning bandwagon.

Two factors, in particular, contributed to the success of the coup. First and foremost, the moratorium on the employment of terror in leadership struggles, which had been in effect since Beria's death in mid-1953, had lowered the risks involved in such intrigue to an acceptable level. Had Khrushchev, like Stalin, been able and willing to use terror selectively to keep his lieutenants in line, the dangers in conspiring might well have prevented any opposition from coalescing into an organized group. Second, Khrushchev appears to have been overconfident and hence careless, as exemplified by the fact that he was frequently away from Moscow in the summer and early fall of 1964 despite serious disagreements between himself and a majority of the Presidium. One suspects that the severe illness of Frol Kozlov in April, 1963, which effectively eliminated one of Khrushchev's most powerful opponents, and the elevation of the latter's protégé, L. I. Brezhnev, to second-in-command in the party Secretariat, contributed to Khrushchev's overconfidence.

MOTIVES FOR THE COUP

What prompted Khrushchev's associates to conspire against him and why did they move in mid-October, 1964? First, Khrushchev's fall must be seen in the broader context of growing dissatisfaction with a number of his policies and the general slackening of the momentum of his regime. In foreign policy,

Khrushchev's reputation was personally on the line in the worsening Sino-Soviet confrontation and the mounting crisis in the whole world Communist movement. In addition, some Soviet leaders appeared to have reservations about Khrushchev's activist pursuit of a détente with the West and, in particular, about his flirtations with West Germany in the summer of 1964.

Domestically, a marked decline in the rate of economic growth heightened disagreements over proper allocation of resources and the best methods to manage the sprawling and increasingly rigidified Soviet economy. The venerable issue of heavy versus light industry had again become exacerbated as living standards failed to increase at rates predicted. The issue was compounded because Khrushchev's extravagant promises of dramatic improvements in living standards in the late 1950's had helped spark a revolution of rising expectations among the populace which was destined to be partially damped after 1960. Shortly before his ouster, Khrushchev appeared to be advocating a major increase of investments in consumer industry.³ His fall neither resolved the issue nor precipitated radically new patterns of resource allocation.

The serious reversals in Soviet agricultural production after the bumper harvest of 1958—especially the disastrous crop of 1963—were a blow to Khrushchev's prestige, because he had staked out agriculture as his personal bailiwick as early as 1953. New policy initiatives in agriculture were greater than initiatives elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. after Khrushchev's fall. Nevertheless, except for easing restrictions on the private sector, most of these policies cannot be regarded as a fundamental repudiation of "Khrushchevism" since they are essentially an extension of earlier measures.

The slowing pace of economic growth also gave rise to an increasingly vociferous discussion about the proper means to manage the Soviet economy. A number of economists in the late 1950's began to advocate, first in professional journals, and then in the popular press, the adoption of various schemes for radically decentralizing the economy by re-

³ *Pravda*, October 2, 1964.

ducing the number of central controls and planning indices and permitting enterprise managers greater leeway in making decisions.

While these—and yet other—contentious issues exacerbated leadership tensions, they do not, in themselves, explain the timing or the immediate causes of Khrushchev's ouster.

"SUBJECTIVISM"

It was Khrushchev's growing tendency to indulge in personalistic rule which appears to have provided the immediate catalyst for the coup against him. It is significant that the sins for which he has been most severely berated are "subjectivism" and the creation of a new cult of personality. For some years, there were signs that Khrushchev was attempting to free himself from the restraints of Presidium deliberations and dependency on the party. One of the hallmarks of Khrushchev's style had been to announce policy initiatives in the press directly to the population over the heads of the Presidium and the Central Committee. Moreover, he had downgraded the Central Committee itself, under the guise of democratization. Instead of closed, business-like sessions, Central Committee plenums became open forums, attended often by hundreds of outside officials.

Published transcripts of these plenums showed Khrushchev dominating the proceedings, interrupting speakers at will to question or criticize. Even important leaders were not immune from Khrushchev's caustic tongue—suggesting that personal rancor may have played no small part in his ouster and subsequent disgrace. Not only may a number of his colleagues have wished to oust him to settle old personal scores, but the fact that Khrushchev had repeatedly asserted his personal authority, apart from the Presidium, may have raised serious concern about his personality and idiosyncrasies. Khrushchev was a colorful leader, but he could also be crude and capricious.

There is evidence that in the late summer, 1964, Khrushchev had determinedly asserted his personal leadership prerogatives. In a tour of the countryside he spoke openly of

new agricultural programs to be adopted in the autumn despite reservations held by "some comrades." Bypassing regular diplomatic channels, in July he sent his son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei to West Germany as his personal emissary on a high-level mission to scout the possibilities of reshaping Soviet-West German relations. On October 2, *Pravda* published a summarized version of Khrushchev's speech to a high-level meeting on the next long-range economic plan in which he put forth proposals for increased allocation of resources to consumer industries. The *Pravda* story implied that Khrushchev's proposal would serve as the basis for drawing up detailed plans. In fact, it is reported that the meeting did not reach a decision on economic priorities; and the *Pravda* article was yet another instance of Khrushchev's attempts to preempt the authority of the party Presidium and the Council of Ministers by announcing policy on his own initiative.

THE PARTY

An analysis of the organization and role of the party also supports the thesis of a conflict between Khrushchev's aspirations for more personalistic rule and the concern of the Presidium members to maintain their collective prerogatives and the authority and integrity of the party as an institution. The most immediate and dramatic reversal of Khrushchev policy came within a month of his fall when the November Central Committee plenum ordered the abrogation of his scheme of party organization promulgated in November, 1962. Upon his personal insistence, the party had been restructured along "production" lines by splitting it into industrial and agricultural wings. Below the republic level, two complete party chains-of-command were created. At the republic and all-union levels, unified party committees were retained but their staffs were, for the most part, divided into industrial and agricultural components. In addition, Central Committee bureaus for Central Asia and Transcaucasia were created at the all-union level.

This departure from the long-standing

"territorial" principle of party organization was one of a series—albeit the most radical—of attempts by Khrushchev to find an organizational solution for bureaucratic lethargy and inefficiency which he viewed as the fundamental cause of the slow-down in the tempo of economic growth.

There is good reason to suspect that Khrushchev also harbored personal political motives for this party reorganization. In 1957–1958 he had clearly established himself as the dominant figure in the Soviet leadership, in large measure by increasing the power and responsibilities of the party *apparatus* of which he was chief. Subsequently, however, he had not been able to break himself loose from his power base in the party. Thus, by splitting the party, he appeared to be strengthening his personal position. The vast reorganization would afford him opportunities to make favorable cadre appointments, and he would be able to play segments of the party off against one another, thus weakening opposition to his will. Finally, with the party more effectively under his control, he could then safely use it to supervise more closely governmental administrators, industrial managers, and the various "public" organizations.

The press campaign launched by Khrushchev's public relations staff in support of the new party structure indicated an absence of universal support for this plan. The press carried numerous rebuttals to suggestions by unnamed "dogmatists" and "revisionists" that the party had been "depoliticized" and that its division into industrial and agricultural branches violated ideological precepts about lessening differences between city and country.

In practice, as might have been predicted, the production format of party organization resulted in confusion and duplication of responsibilities, bickering, and—despite Khrushchev's disclaimers to the contrary—burgeoning of bureaucratic staffs. The disastrous harvest of 1963 was blamed, in part, on

the disorientation of cadres in the countryside as a consequence of the reorganization. Party cadres were urged to interfere ever more deeply with the grass-roots administration of industry and agriculture while, at the same time, the unity of the party was impaired so that it could not perform its vital integrating and coordinating functions within its territorial jurisdictions.

In November, 1964, when the traditional schema was restored, Khrushchev was charged with "hare-brained scheming; half-baked conclusions; and hasty decisions and actions, divorced from reality." Influential party secretary M. A. Suslov has charged that:

Our cause suffered great harm from the frequent and unjustified reorganizations of leading party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organs carried out prior to the October, 1964 Central Committee Plenum. These reorganizations engendered irresponsibility and nervousness in work.⁴

Strong political pressures were also at work in the restoration of the party's organizational unity. In addition to resentment against Khrushchev's political maneuvering at the expense of party integrity, the leadership—as it had after Stalin's death—moved to consolidate and retrench key positions in order to maintain unity and prevent the development of centrifugal forces during a period of uncertainty brought on by the succession; it also sought to woo powerful regional party secretaries whose power had been diluted after the extensive 1962 reorganization.

After November industrial and agricultural party committees were rapidly rejoined, the Central Asian and Transcaucasian bureaus of the Central Committee were abolished and the Central Committee staff was modified so that it more closely resembled the pre-1962 structure.

Reunification of the party has been accompanied by renewed discussions of its proper role in society. Throughout Soviet history, the relationship of the party to the state administration, industrial management, military command and various public organizations has been at best vaguely defined and

⁴ *Pravda*, June 5, 1965.

⁵ "KPSS v. tsifrah," *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 10 (May, 1965), p. 17.

frequently shifting. During most of the Khrushchev era, the party *apparatus* was intensively involved on a daily basis in a wide variety of administrative responsibilities. In recent months, party propaganda has tended to lay greater stress on the party's political-ideological-agitational role and to warn against petty tutelage in supervising the work of other agencies and falling into the attitude of "narrow practicism."⁶ Similarly, in July, 1965, First Secretary Brezhnev told the graduates of Soviet military academies that "further measures to strengthen single command and to raise the authority of the commanders must be the object of a constant concern of all commanders, political organs and party organizations." Although he reasserted the orthodox position of ultimate party supremacy over the military command, he did indicate a lessening of direct interference with military affairs by professional party cadres, a position which contrasts markedly with pronouncements after the disgrace of Marshal G. A. Zhukov in October, 1957, calling for more intensive party supervision of the military.⁷

These cautious and tentative efforts to redefine the party's role should be viewed in connection with a number of public statements—especially by persons occupied in economic administration and planning—condemning "administrative rule" which ignores "economic levers" and asserting the need for "political acts and decisions to proceed from the demands of economic development." Shortly after Khrushchev's removal, the authoritative *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* editorialized as follows on the relationship between economics and politics: "Not administrative rule, not 'reorganizations' and 're-reorganizations,' but economic levers should induce enterprises to use production funds better, to expand materials more economically, to introduce new equipment more rapidly. . . ."⁸ In short, the party must eschew arbitrary administrative methods and recognize the need to govern the society with

more finesse and regularity, permitting greater autonomy to other institutions.

It should be emphasized that those persons urging reform in party methods are not attacking the party's monopoly of power or its authority to establish national goals and to monitor the execution of policy. Indeed many would argue that if the party is to govern effectively, it should retrench and forbid its staff to become overinvolved in the work of other agencies so that it will be able to maintain its sense of identity and perspective. On the other hand, such a *modus operandi* would require the party to exercise its power with greater restraint, a prescription to which party secretaries on the firing line normally find it difficult to adhere since they are ultimately responsible for all occurrences within their geographical jurisdictions. Moreover, restraint goes against the tradition of activism inculcated into the party *apparatus*.

The proposal to introduce new methods of industrial management granting enterprise managers broad powers to make decisions on the basis of such economic criteria as profits, sharpens the issue of the party's role; for such schemes would necessarily contain implications for the operations of party cadres. Hence, it is not surprising that much of the opposition to such plans appears to be politically motivated. At least some party functionaries fear that to move in the direction of market socialism would run the risk of undercutting direction of the economy by the political leadership.

The changing roles and organization of the party have been accompanied by alterations in its composition. After a great surge of party enrollments during World War II, growth slackened during the first postwar decade. Beginning in the mid-1950's the party again began a period of rapid expansion as the regime attempted to broaden its social base. From a membership of 6,882,145 in 1952, it increased to 11,758,169 members by January, 1965 (including 946,726 candidates). The party grew at a rate of approximately 500,000 annually between 1956 and 1961 and the rate was stepped up

⁶ See, for example, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 13, 1965.

⁷ *Pravda*, July 6, 1965.

⁸ *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, November 18, 1964.

TABLE I: PRESIDIUM OF THE C.P.S.U. CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 1964-1965

	<u>SEPTEMBER, 1964</u>	<u>JULY, 1965</u>
<u>Full Members</u>		
Holding Party Positions		
L. I. Brezhnev	-Secretary, Party Central Committee	-First Secretary, Central Committee
A. P. Kirilenko	-First Deputy Chairman, Central Committee Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R.	-Same
N. V. Podgorny	-Secretary, Party Central Committee	-Same
M. A. Suslov	-Secretary, Party Central Committee	-Same
Frol Kozlov	-Secretary, Party Central Committee	-Died
N. M. Shvernik	-Chairman, Party Control Commission	-Same
N. M. Shelest	-Same (promoted from candidate)
Holding Government Positions		
A. N. Kosygin	-First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers	-Chairman, Council of Ministers
A. I. Mikoyan	-Chairman, Presidium, Supreme Soviet	-Same
D. S. Polyansky	-Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers	-Same
G. I. Voronov	-Chairman, R.S.F.S.R. Council of Ministers	-Same
K. T. Mazurov	-First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers (promoted from candidate)
Holding Both Party and Government Positions		
N. S. Khrushchev	-First Secretary, Central Committee; Chairman, Council of Ministers; Chairman, Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R.	-Dismissed
A. N. Shelepin	-Secretary, Central Committee; Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers; Chairman, Party-State Control Committee
<u>Candidate Members</u>		
K. T. Mazurov	-First Secretary, Belorussian Party Central Committee	-(Promoted to full member)
V. P. Mzhavanadze	-First Secretary, Georgian Party Central Committee	-Same
Sh. R. Rashidov	-First Secretary, Uzbek Party Central Committee	-Same
P. Y. Shelest	-First Secretary, Ukrainian Party Central Committee	-(Promoted to full member)
L. N. Yefremov	-First Deputy Chairman, Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R.	-First Secretary, Stavropol Krai Party Committee (status in doubt)
V. V. Grishin	-Chairman, Trade Unions Council	-Same
P. N. Demichev	-Secretary, Party Central Committee
D. F. Ustinov	-Secretary, Party Central Committee

to 600,000–700,000 annually in the next two years. In 1964, 880,000 candidates and 741,000 members were received into the party, the largest influx in postwar years.⁹

Between 1956 and 1964, the occupational classifications of C.P.S.U. membership percentages changed as follows:

	1956	1961	1964
Workers	32.0	35.0	37.3
Peasants (<i>kolkhozi</i> s)	17.1	17.3	16.5
Employees and others	50.9	47.7	46.2

The decline in the percentage of *kolkhozniks* results in part because a number of collective farms were transformed into state farms whose members are classified as workers. Nonetheless, the traditional weakness of party membership in the countryside continues despite occasional recruitment drives there. It should be noted that in recruiting workers and peasants—as well as employees—emphasis is placed on “leading” workers and peasants.

The educational level of the C.P.S.U. membership also continues to improve. The percentage of Communists with a complete secondary education or better increased from 37 per cent in 1956 to 47.7 per cent in 1965. Fifteen per cent of the members have completed higher education. The party has also reached out to embrace the Soviet scientific community. By January, 1965, 63,120 Communists held the degree of candidate of science and 6,783 the degree of doctor of science.

THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP

In contrast to the colorful, rough and ready style of Khrushchev, his successors have adopted a public image of businesslike efficiency and proper decorum. The impression created of a triumph by the “organization men” over the political wheeler-dealer *cum charisma* is reinforced by the scrupulously tended facade of “collective leadership.” The positions of party first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers, which Khrushchev held concurrently after 1958, have been assigned to L. I.

Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin respectively. Both are accorded parity in public treatment. At the same time, they carefully emphasize their oneness with the leadership collective.

In contrast to the wholesale leadership reshuffling following Stalin’s death and the abortive attempt to overthrow Khrushchev in June, 1957, thus far Khrushchev’s ouster has not resulted in far-reaching personnel changes in high places. The party Presidium on August 1, 1965, consisted of 12 full and 6 candidate members, an increase of one full member compared to the last Khrushchev Presidium roster (see Table I). Of the 12 full Presidium members, six hold posts in the party’s professional *apparatus*, five in the government and one, Shelepin, bridges both party and governmental administrations. This division represents a modest reduction in the representation of the party apparatus on the Presidium, resulting in greater balance between party and governmental representatives. The Central Committee Secretariat on which Khrushchev had relied heavily to govern and had greatly enlarged, has been reduced by three secretaries; it still, however, has the relatively large membership of nine. In short, there has been a detectable, though moderate, shift away from domination of the Presidium by the party machine.

Those individuals who suffered demotions after Khrushchev’s fall, by and large, can be considered to have been his personal aides, especially those bearing responsibilities in agriculture, ideology and mass communications. Central Committee secretary, V. I. Polyakov, and first deputy chairman of the Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R., L. N. Yefremov, who bore special responsibilities for agriculture, were

(Continued on page 242)

Howard R. Swearer has written widely on the Soviet Communist party and on Soviet administration and domestic politics. In addition to numerous articles, he is the author of *The Politics of Succession in the U.S.S.R.* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964) and co-editor of *Contemporary Communism: Theory and Practice* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1963).

⁹ *Partiinaya zhizn'*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-17.

Has Soviet military policy changed? In answering this question this expert says that "though Khrushchev talked a strong line of support for national liberation conflicts, when test cases arose he proved to be essentially a straddler. . . ." And today, he continues, the Soviet leaders must still choose "whether to commit themselves ever more deeply to a dangerous effort to dislodge the United States from Southeast Asia or seek some way to . . . avoid . . . a grave military confrontation with the United States."

Military Policy: A Soviet Dilemma

By THOMAS W. WOLFE

Staff Member, The RAND Corporation

IN THE FIRST MONTHS following Nikita Khrushchev's overthrow in October, 1964, the new Soviet collective leadership under Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin proclaimed its solicitude for strengthening the Soviet Union's defenses, as might be expected, but at the same time the new leaders rather studiously avoided the key question, whether any comprehensive alterations in Soviet defense posture and policy were deemed necessary. Since early 1965, however, when international tension began to tighten around the growing crisis in Southeast Asia, the standpat position of the new regime in the defense domain evidently has become increasingly difficult to maintain.*

On the domestic front, the new regime faced the need to tackle certain basic internal problems plaguing the Soviet Union: to find a realistic solution of the perennially unsatisfactory agricultural situation; to boost declining rates of economic growth; and to deal with other cumulatively frustrating questions such as the party's proper role in the management of a modern society, the restiveness of

the intelligentsia, pressures from the population for better living standards, and so on.

Thus, together with an understandable reluctance to revive internal controversy over defense matters during the delicate process of consolidating their rule, the desire of the new leaders to make inroads upon the Soviet Union's domestic problems probably accounted for their initial tendency to avoid striking out upon major military policy revisions of their own. Furthermore, progress toward solution of internal difficulties seemed likely to be tied in some important respects to external conditions—requiring, for example, a fairly stable international situation in which the danger of war could be kept under control, in addition to the continuation of better relations with the United States.

By contrast with these factors bearing upon domestic policy problems, a second set of considerations confronting the new regime concerned the need to repair the Soviet Union's international position, not only in the power struggle with the West but in the increasingly bitter competition for leadership within the Communist world itself. This twofold challenge in the international sphere called for the Soviet Union to play a more vigorous role in support of so-called "national-liberation" struggles in the underdeveloped world, to

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cope with revolutionary competition from Peking, to deal with national restlessness among countries of Eastern Europe, and to find a formula for weakening NATO and checking the resurgence of German power in Europe. By and large, a foreign policy course directed toward these objectives appeared likely to entail a sharpening of United States-Soviet relations, to raise the risk of serious conflict over such issues as Vietnam, and to demand larger resource allocations to defense-heavy industry at the expense of economic growth and domestic reform programs.

As the record of their first year in office suggests, Khrushchev's successors have not found it feasible to make a clear-cut choice between these two broad sets of policy alternatives: whether to give priority to orderly internal development and the patching up of United States-Soviet relations on the one hand, or to press more stubbornly for new revolutionary gains in the troubled areas of the world on the other, with all the attendant risks and liabilities of pursuing the latter course to its unpredictable end. This fundamental dilemma, in turn, has made it difficult for the new regime to formulate an integrated policy approach of its own in the field of defense, although events seem to be forcing the leadership's hand.

DEFENSE ALLOCATION

Most of the major issues of current consequence in the realm of Soviet defense policy have roots running back to the Khrushchev era. Among these, a central issue is certainly that of defense claims upon Soviet resources—a prime *vexata quaestio* which has always been closely linked with the general problem of resource allocation among competing claimants upon the Soviet economy. Developments of the past year indicate that the issue of defense allocation remains very much alive, not only as a potential source of disagreement between Soviet military and po-

litical leaders, but also as a focal point of contention within the political leadership itself.

One of the first questions arising after Khrushchev's overthrow was whether the Soviet military had an important hand in the coup and might consequently expect to be repaid by a greater share of resources for defense and a larger professional voice in defense policy decisions than had been the case under Khrushchev. The state budget announced by Kosygin in December¹ seemed to reflect an essentially standpat position by the new regime. It called for a projected 1965 military expenditure of 12.8 billion rubles, about 500 million rubles less than Khrushchev's 1964 defense budget.

On the face of it, this budget action suggested that the Soviet military had acquired no substantial claim to greater influence as a result of Khrushchev's fall, an impression that was fortified by such things as failure to promote any military men to leading organs of the party as had been the case after the repulse of the "anti-party group" in the leadership crisis of 1957.² The new budget figure for defense expenditure also suggested that Khrushchev's successors had decided not to tamper for the time being with his basic defense philosophy, the essential feature of which was an attempt to economize by reducing the size of the traditionally-massive Soviet theater forces and concentrating on the deterrent value of strategic missiles.

Short-term economic plans outlined by Kosygin when the 1965 budget was announced were likewise indicative of a desire to avoid radical alterations in the pattern of resource allocation. The plans emphasize orderly growth of all sectors of the economy with special attention to consumer needs, but not stinting on defense and heavy industry: in effect, promises in all directions, with the real test of conflicting resource claims postponed. These claims were subsequently to come back into the picture, however, both in response to the pressure of world events and in connection with such internal planning operations as the Soviet calendar as drafting of a new 5-Year Plan to replace the current 7-Year Plan.

¹ *Pravda*, December 10, 1964.

² For a useful discussion of this matter, see Nikolai Galay, "The Role of the Soviet Army in Khrushchev's Overthrow," Reference Paper No. 16, 1964/65, *Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Munich, Germany.

which is set to run out at the end of 1965.³

Among the first signs that the resource allocation issue had not been laid to rest was the gradual resumption, beginning in early 1965, of a low-keyed debate in the Soviet press over certain controversial issues of defense policy. For a few months after Khrushchev's fall, a ceasefire of sorts had prevailed on the defense policy front, with both the new political leadership and professional military circles remaining largely noncommittal on substantive defense issues which had been under contention in the latter years of Khrushchev's rule.⁴ The debate was given a fresh start in January, not long after announcement of the 1965 budget, by two Soviet military writers in a widely-noted *Red Star* article⁵ which laid down an unmistakable challenge to the basic rationale on which Khrushchev's military policy had rested.

³ Another event likely to bring submerged policy issues to the surface, including those of defense and resource priorities, is the 23rd Party Congress. According to party procedure, this should be held before the end of 1965, but there have been indications of postponement, suggesting that a satisfactory policy consensus has been hard to achieve.

⁴ A detailed examination of the defense policy debate of the Khrushchev period may be found in the present author's *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

⁵ Major General K. Bochkarev and Colonel I. Sidelnikov, "New Epoch, New Conclusions—On Development by the Party of V. I. Lenin's Ideas on War, Peace, and Safeguarding the Conquests of Socialism and Communism," *Red Star*, January 21, 1965. Another interesting shift from a doctrinal position on war associated with Khrushchev occurred some weeks later when Marshal V. I. Chuikov reasserted the view that, if nuclear war should occur, the Communist system would emerge triumphant. (Moscow radio broadcast, March 16, 1965). Khrushchev had often argued, although not entirely consistently, that a nuclear war would be so mutually destructive that it would be futile to expect a new Communist order to arise from its ruins.

⁶ Zakharov's previous tenure as Chief of the General Staff had ended with his replacement in early 1963 by Marshal S. S. Biriuzov, generally regarded as more sympathetic to Khrushchev's policies. Zakharov was reappointed about a month after Biriuzov's death in an airplane crash.

⁷ Marshal M. V. Zakharov, "Imperative Demand of the Times: On Improving Further the Scientific Level of Military Leadership," *Red Star*, February 5, 1965.

⁸ Colonel General S. M. Shtemenko, "The Queen of the Battlefield Relinquishes Her Crown," *Vedelya*, No. 6, January 31–February 6, 1965. *Vedelya* is a weekly supplement to the newspaper *zvestiia*.

By amending the Leninist doctrine of *inevitable war* between the capitalist and Communist systems, Khrushchev had centered his policy in effect on the *possibility of preventing war*, which led him to place more stress on the deterrent value of nuclear-missile weapons than on across-the-board preparations for fighting a war if one should occur.

This article, with its critical undertone toward the false economies of Soviet military policy under Khrushchev's "subjective" leadership, was followed in February by further signs that the new regime was being nudged to avoid Khrushchev's example and to give greater heed to professional military advice. Several prominent military figures publicly proffered hints along this line, although it was also apparent that they were not necessarily in full accord among themselves on what professional advice should be given.

Marshal M. V. Zakharov, who had been reappointed as Chief of the General Staff in November,⁶ took the lead in stressing the importance of professional military expertise in the formulation of defense policy. Writing in *Red Star*,⁷ Zakharov placed strong emphasis on the "scientific" determination of military requirements, but he steered clear of prescribing specific changes in the priorities established in Khrushchev's time, thus failing to show where Zakharov stood on the matter of resource allocation. By contrast, another leading Soviet military man, Colonel General S. M. Shtemenko, presented in early February a forthright argument for a broad and well-balanced military establishment in terms that plainly offered little prospect of curbing increased demands on the budget.⁸ Shtemenko also reopened several other doctrinal arguments of the Khrushchev period, including the issue of the relative importance of strategic missiles and ground forces and the question of long-versus-short war in the nuclear age.

Here, the point to be noted is that resumption of the military policy debate coincided rather closely with the onset in February, 1965, of a new phase of crisis in Southeast Asia. There seems little doubt that developments in Vietnam—by posing the possibility

of escalation to a larger-scale war and underscoring the need for a demonstratively stronger Soviet defense posture—contributed to lifting the lid on the military debate and prompted genuine second thoughts in Soviet leadership circles about the wisdom of the standpat defense budget adopted in December, 1964. Nonetheless, as the course of the military policy discussion during the ensuing months testifies, a consensus was not to be readily reached on the question of defense allocation and related issues.

Built around the general theme of the critical importance of having adequate forces in being prior to the outbreak of a war, theoretical arguments for shifting policy priority to the needs of defense were laid out by several prominent military theorists. One of the more notable of the lobbying efforts was a *Red Star* article in March by Colonel V. Larionov, in which a discussion of the much-debated question whether a nuclear war would prove long or short was utilized to get across the point that there are no ruble-saving shortcuts to Soviet security.⁹ Observing that miscalculations about the duration of war in the past were not fatal because a country could always increase its buildup of forces and war production during the conflict itself, Larionov warned that this would probably be impossible under nuclear-age conditions. Accordingly, the only safe policy even for “a non-aggressive country like the USSR” was to devote the requisite effort and resources to preparing itself beforehand for both a lightning and a protracted war. Coming from Larionov, a writer of “modernist” bent whose ideas in the past had often lent intellectual underpinning to Khrushchev’s strategic views, this line of argument suggested that both modernist and traditionalist wings of Soviet

military opinion had drawn closer to oppose any tendency to skimp on defense resources.

Along with this theoretical discussion of manpower priorities, there was, however, at least one practical step in March, 1965, that suggested some resistance to claims of the defense establishment on high-quality personnel. This was a decree reducing to one year the obligatory term for specialists with higher education drafted into the armed forces.¹⁰ This decree may have been prompted by the needs of industry for manpower skills tied up in the military establishment, as well as by morale dissatisfaction among specialists spending “wasted years” in the military. Presumably, only a small percentage of military recruits were affected by the decree, but nevertheless it indicated that the new regime was not disposed to give the military a blank check in drawing upon skilled personnel.

While lobbying in the military press on the general question of resource priorities for defense was doubtless self-serving to some extent, it would not appear that sides were neatly drawn between military and political leaders. Within the political leadership itself, there were signs of tugging and hauling over the issue. It was even possible that military leaders had been given private assurances that defense claims would be reconsidered, and that lobbying by the military was in fact condoned and encouraged by some elements of the political leadership. The relatively low-keyed theoretical tone of the military arguments might support this supposition.

Among signs of policy ferment within the political leadership itself on resource priorities in the spring of 1965 was Brezhnev’s cryptic comment in March, in connection with announcement of a major new agricultural program involving 71 billion rubles of investment over a five-year period, that the program would require “redistribution of state budgetary allocations.”¹¹ Brezhnev failed, however, to spell out how resources might be redistributed. Neither did Kosygin, reporting a month later on progress in the drafting of the new Five-Year Plan for 1966–1970,¹² indicate what specific reorientation of investment

⁹ Colonel V. Larionov, “New Weapons and the Duration of War,” *Red Star*, March 18, 1965. See also, G. Miftiev, “War and Manpower Resources,” *Red Star*, June 4, 1965.

¹⁰ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, March 27, 1965, published in *Red Star*, April 1, 1965.

¹¹ Report by L. I. Brezhnev, “Urgent Measures for the Further Development of Soviet Agriculture,” *Pravda*, March 27, 1965.

¹² *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (Planned Economy), No. 4, April, 1965, pp. 8–10.

priorities might emerge, although his remarks suggested that drafters of the plan were having difficulties on this score.

More revealing hints that defense priorities were a source of contention among high political leaders came to light in the next few months. In May, N. V. Podgorny, one of the more powerful members of the new ruling coterie, made a speech in Baku in which he took the position that restrictions on consumer welfare and material sacrifices by the population in order to allow for "priority development of heavy industry and strengthening of defense" were a thing of the past.¹³ This view, closely resembling the line adopted by Khrushchev just before his ouster, was bluntly challenged about a week later by M. A. Suslov, another influential member of the party leadership. Speaking in Sofia on June 2, Suslov asserted that "objective reality" and the "international duty" of the Soviet Union to meet the threat from "imperialism" required continuing "material sacrifices" by the people in order to maintain Soviet defenses at the "highest level."¹⁴

Indications that the view espoused by Suslov was gaining ascendancy among the political leadership were later evident in statements by both Brezhnev and Kosygin. The former, addressing Soviet military academy graduates on July 3, placed great emphasis on the Soviet Union's military strength, especially its missile forces.¹⁵ At the same time, he noted that the planning in progress for economic development was taking account of the need "to strengthen the country's defense capacity. . . ."

¹³ N. V. Podgorny, "Within the Friendly Family of Peoples of the USSR: Toward New Successes in the Building of Communism," *Pravda*, May 22, 1965.

¹⁴ "Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship Will Live Eternally: Speech of Comrade M. A. Suslov," *Pravda*, June 5, 1965.

¹⁵ Speech by L. I. Brezhnev at Kremlin Reception for Military Academy Graduates, July 3, 1965, in supplement to *Moscow News*, July 10, 1965.

¹⁶ Speech by Comrade A. N. Kosygin, *Pravda*, July 12, 1965.

¹⁷ Of several troop cuts carried out under Khrushchev, the last one prior to his December, 1963 proposal was the program to reduce the armed forces from 3.6 to 2.4 million men, announced in January 1960. This program was suspended during the Berlin crisis in mid-1961, presumably about half-completed.

In ceremonies at Volgograd, Kosygin offered assurances that Soviet defense industry was geared "to the level dictated by the international situation," but he also took pains to point out that upkeep of a modernized Soviet military establishment "demands very large expenditures which we would gladly devote to other branches of the national economy." However, Kosygin went on to say, "In the present situation, to economize on defense would be acting against the interests of the Soviet state and the Soviet people."¹⁶

These expressions of determination not to economize on defense by top Soviet leaders could be interpreted to mean that the inner debate on resource allocation had been resolved on terms favoring the advocates of a higher level of defense preparation. At the same time, however, there was no parallel evidence of a willingness to accept major retrenchment of programs for domestic economic improvement. This suggested that the resource allocation problem would probably continue to be vexatious.

TROOP REDUCTION?

Much of the policy debate between modernists and traditionalists in Khrushchev's day had turned on two interlocking issues: how large should the Soviet military establishment be, and what relative weight and importance should be accorded the several branches of the armed forces? In December, 1963, Khrushchev fed the debate on these issues by proposing a further reduction in the size of the armed forces—a measure which promised, as in precedent cases,¹⁷ to fall most heavily on the theater ground forces. These forces, the traditional core of Soviet military power, are the preserve of the old-line "combined arms commanders" from whom most of the top Soviet military leaders have sprung in the past.

After the new regime took over, it neither reaffirmed nor disavowed Khrushchev's last publicized troop-reduction proposal, which had elicited patent opposition among conservative military circles in 1964 before Khrushchev's fall. In February, 1965, however, the troop cut issue came briefly to the surface in a

curious way which suggested a good deal of internal sparring over the question.

Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, a prominent officer in semi-retirement, held a press conference on February 17 at which he took the rather unusual step of giving a precise numerical figure for the manpower strength of the U.S.S.R.'s armed forces. These, he reportedly said, "today number 2.423 million men,"¹⁸ a figure which happened to coincide with the goal first set by Khrushchev in January, 1960, and again presumably intended as the goal of his December, 1963, proposal. He also mentioned that further manpower cuts and withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe were possible if the West would reciprocate.

It was noteworthy that Sokolovskii's revelation implying completion of Khrushchev's previously-proposed troop cuts came at a time of rising tension when other military spokesmen were urging that Soviet defenses be strengthened. Not only did this put him somewhat out of step with his military colleagues, at least one of whom promptly responded with a *Red Star* article which cast aspersions on Sokolovskii's judgment as a wartime leader,¹⁹ but his troop-strength state-

ment subsequently fell under quiet censorship, suggesting official sensitivity to his having brought the matter up at all.²⁰ Internal policy debate on the pros and cons of steps either already taken or pending with regard to troop levels and their related impact on the status of the theater ground forces might have accounted for such sensitivity at the time.

A second sign of skirmishing over policy affecting the relative roles of ground forces and other arms came to light in April, centering on the previously-mentioned article by Colonel General Shtemenko published in *Izvestiia* in February. Although the article had argued in the main for balanced ground, air, and naval forces, both its title and content conveyed the view that the ground forces had yielded their crown to the strategic missile forces as the "queen of battle." This notion was singled out for criticism in an April *Pravda* article reporting on a speech by Marshal P. A. Rotmistrov.²¹ As the speaker, a famous tank expert, had spearheaded a doctrinal protest in early 1964 against Khrushchev's "one-weapon" emphasis on missiles at the expense of other forces,²² this statement suggested that he was again taking up the critic's cudgel in a similar controversy.

These skirmishes in the press, along with such previously-cited arguments as those by Miftiev on the present-day importance of "numerical strength" as well as "firepower," seemed to point toward unsettled policy differences over the size and tasks of the Soviet theater forces. Internal debate over the status of these forces was partly related to the reaction of some Soviet strategists to NATO planning and the NATO "strategy of flexible response," which led a number of Soviet military men both before and after Khrushchev's ouster to suggest that greater account should be given the possibility of nonnuclear theater warfare.²³ This view, of course, implied a need for theater force preparations more costly in manpower and other resources than Khrushchev evidently thought necessary. The theater force issue also bore on the question of Soviet military relations with Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in East Europe and with its somewhat more doubtful ally in Peking.

¹⁸ Some ambiguity arose from Soviet press and radio accounts of the interview as to whether Sokolovskii had said that the 2.4 million force level was an accomplished fact or simply still a goal previously fixed by the Supreme Soviet in January, 1960.

¹⁹ The article in question was by Marshal I. K. Bagramian, who pointedly criticized the judgment of an unnamed Front commander for failure to allot sufficient forces to insure success against a powerful enemy in the Bryansk-Orel operation in World War II. The Front commander in question happened to be Sokolovskii. See "History of a Particular Plan," *Red Star*, February 21, 1965.

²⁰ Sokolovskii's motives remain obscure, but two possibilities are: first, that he may have been speaking for elements in the political leadership hopeful of keeping open the door to détente with the United States; or, second, that he was engaged in a calculated gambit to dissuade the West from stepping up the tempo of its own military programs during a period of crisis.

²¹ "The Armored Shield of the Motherland," *Pravda*, April 15, 1965.

²² For a discussion of the incipient doctrinal revolt led by Rotmistrov in 1964 against Khrushchev's new "orthodoxy" of missile primacy, see *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, pp. 168-171.

²³ Military men suggesting that under some conditions the possibility of nonnuclear warfare might be on the increase included Marshals Sokolovskii and Rotmistrov.

With regard to the Warsaw Pact, a serious Soviet effort had begun around 1960 to place greater collective military responsibilities on the East European countries, calling not only for continued contributions to early warning and air defense, but also for a larger joint role in offensive and defensive theater operations. This shift to greater dependence on East European forces in Soviet planning had undercut Khrushchev's troop-reduction aims, but it was by no means clear that his successors would find it convenient to reinforce his policy, especially under pressure from an influential theater-force lobby among the Soviet marshals and in the face of uncertainty about the political disposition of the East European countries to lend themselves wholeheartedly to Soviet planning for the Warsaw Pact. As far as China was concerned, failure to settle the Sino-Soviet dispute after Khrushchev's removal doubtless prompted questions among the new regime's professional military advisors about the wisdom of reducing theater-force levels, which would make it more difficult to deploy additional Soviet forces to the Far East, if necessary, without weakening the Soviet military posture vis-à-vis Europe.

Although there were thus various reasons for supposing that the theater-force issue remained a bone of contention, the new regime itself made comparatively little effort to spell out where it stood on this question or on the broader problem of realigning relative force priorities within the armed forces as a whole. Indeed, judging from the statements of top political leaders and the character of demonstrative military displays in Red Square in November, 1964, and May, 1965, one might infer that the new regime was still inclined to follow Khrushchev's example of dramatizing Soviet nuclear-missile might as the chief element of Soviet military power aimed at

giving the "imperialists" pause. Brezhnev, in particular, stressed that the Soviet Union was "paying special attention to nuclear-missile weapons," although he also noted upon occasion that it was not neglecting the "great role which conventional arms still fulfill."²⁴ Incidentally, his boast in July, 1965, that the Soviet Union's missile arsenal includes weapons of the "orbital" variety had the effect—perhaps undesired—of raising questions in the Western press about possible Soviet evasion of the 1963 United Nations resolution against the orbiting of nuclear weapons.²⁵

As if to lend authority to Soviet claims of prowess in the field of strategic weapons, the new regime trotted out for the Red Square anniversary parades a considerably larger and more ostentatious display of various types of missiles than had ever been exhibited in Khrushchev's time. These included not only ICBM's and shorter-range missiles of both liquid and solid-propellant types, but also missiles for launching from Soviet submarines and some for antimissile employment.²⁶ Soviet commentators made it a point to stress that these demonstrations were "proof" of Soviet missile might and a fitting answer to "alleged" American strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.

Together with the new regime's efforts to project an image of growing Soviet strength in strategic delivery systems, claims were also made of further Soviet advances in the field of defense against missile attack. At the time Khrushchev was displaced, decisions appar-

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²⁴ Speech of July 3, 1965, in Supplement to *Moscow News*, July 10, 1965. See also his speech in *Pravda*, November 8, 1964.

²⁵ "Russia Hints of Rockets that Orbit," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 1965. It may be noted that Soviet claims to possession of "orbital" missiles antedated Brezhnev's assertion by several years.

²⁶ See *The New York Times*, November 8, 1963, May 9, 1965.

In the view of this specialist on Soviet affairs, "In spite of the hostility the Soviet Communists feel toward the West and in spite of a great deal of talk and dreaming about the spread of communism, the Soviet Union has been, in fact, introverted and reluctant to assume an aggressive role in international relations. . . . It is no accident that in recent years Soviet propaganda has reemphasized the historic inevitability of socialism and has underplayed the role of the Communist vanguard. . . ."

Soviet Foreign Policy: A Broad View

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IN THE FALL of 1964, the top Soviet leaders finally decided they had had enough of Premier Nikita Khrushchev's attempts to solve the country's most serious domestic and foreign problems by verbal attacks and harassment and of his constant tinkering with the government, the empire and even the sacrosanct party structure. The *coup* was apparently timed to halt new schemes (which Khrushchev was about to hatch) and to try to avoid his head-on collision course with China.

Actually, Khrushchev's method of crash reforms was very much in the tradition of Lenin and Stalin. But the *apparatchiki* were tired of this type of leadership and its insecurity and wanted to stabilize and rationalize the system. Their revolt was also a reaction to the indecisiveness of Khrushchev's so-called reforms. In spite of public debate on the general principles of the reforms, none were carefully planned and none were carried through to their logical conclusion before Khrushchev was off on another tangent. To the Western observer, Khrushchev seemed caught in a maze of various economic and political pressures, attempts to restore revolutionary agitation *a la* Trotsky and Lenin, and a series of half-thought-through ideas. His foreign policy fit this same pattern.

Khrushchev had pushed into Asia and Africa hoping to buy allies and cut off the economic lifeline of Western Europe, but Europe prospered and the Soviet Union was able to purchase only a few fair-weather friends. He precipitated new crises in Berlin only to have them end when the U.S.S.R. backed away from its threats. He rushed headlong into the Cuban missile crisis in a apparently desperate effort to retrieve a deteriorating military balance, without calculating the risks and the world's reaction. He talked glowingly of a new commonwealth of socialist states but was unable to give it even a concrete image, let alone reality. In the meantime, the Soviet empire began rapidly drifting apart. Having failed to come to terms with China by secret negotiations and manipulation, Khrushchev started a war of words with China. By 1963, it was clear that the U.S.S.R. was losing the verbal battle and the allegiance of a growing number of Communists. At this late date Khrushchev decided, in the grand revolutionary tradition of Lenin, to read China out of the Communist movement at an international conference. Again Khrushchev failed to calculate the risks and possibilities and soon found he had few supporters for his scheme, even among his closest allies and dependents in Eastern and

Western Europe. Given this opposition, if he had stayed in power Khrushchev would probably have again backed down. In spite of his wild schemes, in the end Khrushchev had always recognized reality. But Khrushchev's associates were not willing to accept another public disgrace.

It is clear that in assuming power Khrushchev's colleagues were not motivated by new evolutionary goals or new programs, either domestic or foreign. If anything, they wanted to avoid new ideas and do some cautious experimenting. Initially, they hoped to put foreign affairs on ice and concentrate on domestic problems. They endorsed friendly relations with China while not giving in to China on any major issue; they continued the policy of peaceful coexistence and reduced the military budget by one-half billion rubles in 1965.¹ But as a policy this was as unrealistic as any of Khrushchev's fantasies. To think that the world, and especially China, would wait while Russia prepared itself, and that the new leaders, any more than Khrushchev, could make peaceful coexistence compatible with friendship with China were delusions of grandeur. In the Soviet situation, caught between two great powers, militarily and economically inferior to one and politically inferior to the other, some basic revaluation of foreign policy was necessary. But in the beginning there was no evidence that the new leaders of the *apparatchiki* had decided to take on this task. The force of circumstances and the unfavorable balance of power finally convinced them that some reassessment of goals was paramount.

SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

In Soviet foreign relations, the Sino-Soviet dispute has come to dominate and color all other issues. Thus the first application of the go-slow policy of the new leadership was to reduce the importance and delay for three months until March, 1965, the preparatory conference of Communist parties originally

aimed at disciplining the Chinese renegades; when it was held the conference did nothing more than confirm the need for unity and consultation to solve disputes.² Second, recognizing that the Moscow-Peking polemics prevented accommodation and were damaging the whole international Communist movement and the U.S.S.R. in particular, the party and government abruptly stopped all public attacks on the Chinese.

Although Khrushchev's foreign policy was often erratic, ineffective and based on bluff, he usually managed to keep the initiative. Adopting their go-slow tactic, the new leadership immediately lost the initiative, which was taken up by China and the United States. At the time of the *coup*, China applauded Aleksei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev for their ouster of Khrushchev and stopped its verbal assaults, but soon made it clear that accommodation depended on the complete surrender of the Soviet Union to the Chinese position. The Chinese leaders seemed not at all deterred by the prospect of having both superpowers as enemies. As part of their revolutionary ideology, the Chinese accept and even seem to prefer to maintain a minority, inferior status, confident that perseverance will ultimately turn set-backs and defeats into victory. The Russians were unwilling to capitulate; and Premier Kosygin's visit to the Far East in early 1965 did not even result in a joint communiqué with China.

China, quickly recognizing the impossibility of a conciliation, took advantage of the Soviet policy of relaxation to turn the tables and took steps to read Russia out of the revolutionary movement in Asia and Africa. Thus Chou En-lai undertook a diplomatic pilgrimage throughout Asia and Africa to keep the U.S.S.R. out of the Afro-Asian conference of heads-of-states which was to be held in June, 1965, in Algiers. At the same time, the Chinese increased their aid and propaganda activities in both East and West Africa, refusing to be discouraged by the evaporation of the Communist-supported rebellion in the Congo and the expulsion of the oversized Chinese embassy from Burundi in January, 1965. In Asia, China tried to undermine relations be-

¹ In presenting the budget for 1965, Kosygin adopted as his slogan, "peace to build communism."

² "Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow," *Pravda*, March 10, 1965.

tween North Vietnam and Russia by delaying the transshipment of Soviet aid to Hanoi and by denouncing the Soviet Union repeatedly as an ally of imperialism because of its attempts to ameliorate the expanding war in Vietnam. In Mongolia, Russia's only remaining Asian satellite, the Chinese tried to bring about a pro-Chinese *coup*, but failed.

The United States, whether by design or accident, also took the initiative. In an attempt to stop the eroding political situation in South Vietnam, the Johnson administration decided to bomb supply lines and bases in North Vietnam and to send American troops to participate directly in the fighting against the Vietcong. In the United Nations, the United States continued to press the Soviet Union and the General Assembly to a standstill over the Soviet debt to that body until well into 1965 and refused to compromise on the election of Malaysia to the Security Council in spite of Soviet opposition and the withdrawal of Indonesia.³ And, finally, within the Western Hemisphere, the United States acted (or perhaps overacted) to prevent any Castro-like expansion.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Soviet Union could not avoid involvement in these new crises instigated by China and the United States. There is little evidence that the Soviet leaders consider the United States an imminent military or political threat to themselves, although they have become increasingly disillusioned with the Johnson administration.⁴ They are genuinely afraid the Vietnam war will escalate. On

the one hand, they are concerned that the United States is becoming deeply involved with China and that the record of American successes against world communism, reaching a high point in the Cuban missile crisis, has made the United States government overconfident. On the other hand, they seem not at all convinced that the Chinese, who have also been very successful and are equally cocky, want to or will stay out of the Vietnam war. Neither China nor the United States have permitted the Soviet leaders to perform the role of mediator but have sought to involve the Russians and make it as difficult for the U.S.S.R. as possible. The United States seems willing to sacrifice the various agreements and understandings which have grown up between Moscow and Washington in recent years and has refused to heed Soviet warnings that the bombings of North Vietnam are a threat to peaceful coexistence. The Chinese have accused the Soviet Union of being in league with the imperialists, have snubbed any Soviet attempt to aid North Vietnam and have discouraged the Soviet Union from promoting peaceful negotiations including putting the matter before the Security Council.⁵ The Soviet Union has lost on all sides. Even when President Johnson decided at the end of July, 1965, to push actively for a negotiated settlement, the Soviet Union was left playing a passive, indecisive role.

The Soviet Union has been slow in responding to the rash of new Chinese propaganda attacks. Although at various meetings with the Chinese from November, 1964, to January, 1965, the Russians have failed to find any basis for a solution, they allowed the meetings of the Communist parties to take place in March, 1965, without taking any real steps to deal with the Sino-Soviet split. The Chinese were not slow to react to Soviet pusillanimity. Within a week after the meeting, Chinese students in Moscow provoked a demonstration against the United States embassy; subsequently China publicly protested Soviet police brutality against the students.⁶ After this Chinese denunciations became unrestrained. The Russians still hesitated, because they

³ The Soviet press, in discussing Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, avoided condemning or approving the act. See *Pravda*, January 22, 1965.

⁴ Even during the election campaign the Russians had some doubts about Johnson and preferred him only over Goldwater. See *Izvestiia*, October 10, 1964. For post-election impressions see *Pravda*, November 29, 1964, *Izvestiia*, December 12, 1964, and *Pravda*, May 5, 1965.

⁵ For example, the Soviet Union came out in favor of international conferences on Laos (*Izvestiia*, February 7, 1965) and on Cambodia (*Pravda*, April 9, 1965) obviously in an attempt to get the belligerents to the negotiating table, but the Chinese denounced both attempts.

⁶ *Pravda*, March 13, 1965.

realized that they could gain little by renewing the verbal battle. They responded only after a series of renewed Chinese volleys and then in a restrained manner.⁷

Since the main battleground in the Sino-Soviet conflict has become Asia and Africa, the Soviet Union has renewed its interest in the area, as part of the slow process of building counter-strength. The Chinese consider both Asia and Africa ripe for revolution and increasingly stress the need for violence.⁸ This revolutionary line, however, seems to be meeting with increasing hostility.⁹ The Russians, after Moise Tshombe's surprising success in defeating the Congolese rebels and being accepted by the Afro-Malagasy Common Organization on May 26, 1965, dropped any thought of promoting or aiding new revolutions and concentrated on seeking friends among the established leaders.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is taking a new look at the possibility of satellites in the underdeveloped areas. As long as the chief Soviet Union aim was the elimination of the economic and political influence of the West, satellites in Asia and Africa were counted as political and economic liabilities. Castro was accepted only reluctantly, because Cuba was to serve as a site for missile bases. Today, however, satellites assume a new importance as outposts and rallying points for the pro-Soviet forces against China.

Unlike China, however, the Soviet Union is not seeking dependents through civil wars and infiltration, but is stepping up its pressure on new governments to break completely with

the West, and to raise to the maximum the expectation of their populations for better living standards through radical reforms. Once isolated from the West, these states will be forced to turn to the Communist bloc to bail them out and in this event the Soviet Union will have more to offer than China. Thus far, in competition for satellites, the Chinese seem to be ahead, with Indonesia apparently well in hand and Chinese influence strong in Uganda, Tanzania, and especially the Congo (Brazzaville). In Asia, the U.S.S.R. has only India as an ally against China. While in Africa, the U.A.R. and Algeria, although considered strongly anti-imperialist, have not given up their aid from the West and continue to have friendly relations with China. With the overthrow of Ben Bella, the Soviet position in Algeria is even less sure. But even in North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan and Indonesia, where Chinese influence has been paramount, the Soviet Union has not given up.¹⁰

One Soviet device to counter Chinese influence has been to develop regional conferences of Communist parties as instruments of control in the Middle East and Latin America, where the Soviet Union still has the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of parties.¹¹

POLICIES IN WEST EUROPE

In spite of Soviet preoccupation with the Chinese, the Russians have been unable to put to rest their concerns about Western Europe, particularly about West Germany. They accuse the United States of giving *carte blanche* support to German militarism and revanchism. The sources of Soviet concern about West Germany are several, not the least of which is the memory of two recent invasions. The persistent refusal of Bonn to recognize the existence of the German Democratic Republic and the Oder-Neisse boundary is considered proof of West Germany's aggressive designs. The fear that Germans may not have given up trying to dominate Europe is also reinforced by the outstanding record of West German economic development which threatens to dominate the Com-

⁷ *Pravda*, June 20, 1965. The state visit of Tito to Moscow and the friendship shown him by the Soviet leaders in June, 1965, was additional fuel to the renewed polemics between Moscow and Peking.

⁸ The Chinese, although stressing violent revolution, have not neglected wherever possible to woo the leaders of new nations, especially in Pakistan, Tanzania, Mali, Guinea, Algeria and Egypt.

⁹ For example, President Kenyatta of Kenya has expressed growing concern about Chinese activities in Tanzania, Uganda and his own country and in May, 1965, seized some Chinese military equipment being transhipped through Kenya to Uganda.

¹⁰ For a more detailed review of Soviet policy in Asia, see the article by Charles McLane in this issue.

¹¹ *Pravda*, December 11, 1964 and January 19, 1965.

mon Market and perhaps all of Western Europe. West Germany's economic inroads into many underdeveloped countries also bring to mind Nazi Germany's penetration into the Balkans and elsewhere.

Soviet leaders are also undoubtedly aware that the weakening of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe is reminiscent of the prewar political vacuum in central Europe and further encourages West German revanchism. They are convinced that the Germans have again managed to dupe the United States and Great Britain into supporting them and, because of the threatened withdrawal of France from NATO, the economic weakness of Great Britain and the growing commitment of the United States in Asia, the Russians fear the Germans will assume the major military role in Europe and will acquire atomic weapons and missiles with the help of the United States.

The Soviet Union does not appear optimistic about strengthening Russian relations with French President Charles de Gaulle as a counterbalance, in spite of de Gaulle's overtures in this direction; the Russians have approached negotiations with France with caution.¹² The Soviet Union is afraid that de Gaulle's intransigence, while it may break up NATO, will promote German rearmament. Even within NATO, France's ability economically and politically to check West Germany is doubted. Furthermore, from long experience, the Soviets do not trust de Gaulle with his record of anticommunism. Then, with de Gaulle's age and the unreconciled party system, the long-range political stability of France is also in doubt. Italy as an alter-

native, even with a Communist electoral victory, would have little value as a counterweight and an Italian government dominated by Communists would only exacerbate the problem.

The Soviet Union's maneuverability has been further damaged by its increasing loss of control over the Communist parties of Europe. For example, three of the parties most closely associated with the U.S.S.R.—the French, Czechoslovakian and Polish Communist parties—openly criticized the new Soviet leaders for the way they dismissed Khrushchev. The French Communist party, once the loyal puppet of the Soviet Union, has increasingly gone its own way since the death of Maurice Thorez in July, 1965,¹³ and, at the same time, the death of Italian Communist Palmiro Togliatti has not altered the independent line of the Italian party.

Soviet influence in Eastern Europe also continues to deteriorate. Rumania pursues a rigorously nationalistic line, refusing close economic or political contact with any of its Communist neighbors. The Rumanian Communist party was the only party of Eastern Europe, except Albania's, that was not represented at the March, 1965, meeting of the Communist parties. Even Bulgaria, long a devoted Soviet ally, was threatened in April by a *coup* of apparently nationalistic elements in the military. Soviet economic influence also continues to decline in Eastern Europe. The C.M.E.A. communiqués in spite of their optimistic tone cannot hide the continued failure of the socialist bloc to promote close economic cooperation.¹⁴

The main stress, therefore, of Soviet policy against German revanchism has been to try to discredit the Bonn government. Propaganda attacks have been continuous and reached a peak of intensity in May, 1965, at the time of the twentieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany. In the hope of defaming West Germany in the eyes of the Arab states, whose contacts with Bonn had become extensive, and in an attempt to undercut Bonn's Hallstein doctrine—the doctrine under which West Germany refuses to have diplomatic relations with any states which recog-

¹² M. Kudrin, "Wither the Fifth Republic?" *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 4, 1965, pp. 31-36.

¹³ A resolution of the Central Committee of the French Communist party on October 14, 1964, condemned interference by one party in the affairs of another and stated that the French party would frame its own policies in accord with its own needs.

¹⁴ A. Alekseyev and L. Ivanova, "Prospects of Economic Development Before the C.M.E.A. Countries," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 3, 1965, p. 9, report the continued decline in the average annual growth rate of the Soviet bloc: 13.3 per cent in 1951-55, 10.4 per cent in 1955-56 and 8 per cent in 1964. (C.M.E.A. is a synonym for the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON and C.E.M.A.)

nize the German Democratic Republic—the Soviet government encouraged the state visit of President Ulbricht of the G.D.R. to Egypt. West Germany countered by recognizing Israel, an action which the Soviet Union also exploited to its advantage in the Arab countries. In the end, however, it is doubtful that the Soviets reaped much advantage because their ally, Nasser, suffered a sharp defeat when he was unable to bring all the states of the Arab League to break relations with West Germany.

In an attempt to divide Bonn from her allies the Soviet Union renewed its pressure on Berlin, calculating that Great Britain could always be counted on to adopt a compromising attitude toward Berlin and that the United States, heavily involved in Vietnam, might also be more accommodating.¹⁵ Any concession in Berlin would be a diplomatic defeat for West Germany, but during the first six months of 1965, at least, there was no sign of the West dividing on this issue.

The long-range solution offered by the U.S.S.R. to German revanchism was to renew its plea for a pan-European security system uniting both East and West Europe. This plan was originally put forward in 1954 as a means to break up NATO and became the basis for the rival Warsaw Pact in 1955. There are hints that the revival of this plan is more than a propaganda move and that some Soviet analysts may look upon it as a solution to many taxing problems.¹⁶

Placed in proper perspective, the German and Chinese questions in Soviet foreign relations represent only further complications of the basic dilemma of the Soviet attitude toward the world since becoming a great power after World War II. In spite of the hostility

the Soviet Communists feel toward the West and in spite of a great deal of talk and dreaming about the spread of communism, the Soviet Union has been, in fact, introverted and reluctant to assume an aggressive role in international relations. Its one aggressive attempt (in Berlin) from 1948 to 1950 turned out to be a fiasco. When, in the next decade, the national independence movements, the rapid acceleration of the social revolution in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the aggressive dynamism of the Chinese revolution offered many opportunities and challenges, not one of the Soviet leaders showed the experience or ability to cope and thus resolve the dilemma. It is no accident that in recent years Soviet propaganda has reemphasized the historic inevitability of socialism and has underplayed the role of the Communist vanguard, and the Soviet Union, stressed by Lenin and Stalin respectively.

The new stress on historical determinism is the product of wishful thinking about the future based on the increasing Soviet inability and unwillingness to guide events in the nuclear age in competition with independent revolutionary forces in Asia and Africa. The recent attempt by post-Khrushchev leaders to slow the pace of international activities was a further retreat; it has clearly become hazardous for the Soviet Union to let the dilemma go unresolved. The question is whether a leadership, isolationist in attitude, schooled in the Communist party apparatus, with little experience in foreign relations, and facing major domestic problems, can lay the basis for a realistic and viable foreign policy.

¹⁵ The Communists temporarily blockaded Berlin in an attempt to forestall a meeting of the West German parliament in Berlin on April 7, 1965, and during July the G.D.R. tried to force West German bargemen to purchase East German licenses.

¹⁶ Y. Zhukov, "The Problems of European Peace and Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 6, pp. 3-9. In this connection the favorable remarks by V. Tumanov, head of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, in *Pravda*, December 5, 1964, praising the existence of certain democratic rights and liberties in bourgeois democracies, are of interest.

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Although "In most parts of Asia . . .," as this specialist sees it, "Soviet policy experienced no sharp change as the result of Khrushchev's overthrow," this has not been true in Vietnam, where "there has been a significant shift in Soviet Asian strategies—either in consequence of Khrushchev's departure or because of the course of events in Vietnam."

U.S.S.R. Policy in Asia

By CHARLES B. McLANE

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AS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY of Nikita Khrushchev's fall from power approaches, it is interesting to consider the fate of certain Soviet foreign policies of which he had been both architect and engineer. Attention in this respect attaches particularly to Moscow's policies in Asia—exclusive of China—since it was here that Khrushchev's strategies were perhaps most imaginative and certainly most unlike those of his predecessor, Stalin. At Stalin's death in 1953, Russia was still committed to revolts in Malaya, Burma and the Philippines. The war in Korea, which had brought Moscow indirectly into conflict with a number of new Asian nations, was still unresolved. In Indochina, high promise in the field was sobered by the very real prospect of American intervention on France's side should *Vietminh* successes continue.

American influence, meanwhile, was growing in much of Asia at Moscow's expense. In addition to its natural allies in Asia (such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Formosa and Thailand), the United States had succeeded in establishing cordial relations—certainly more cordial than Russia's—with new states that had no compelling reason, other things being equal, for preferring American friendship to Russian: for instance, India, Indonesia and Burma. In 1953, moreover, Washington appeared to be well on its

way to creating a defensive alliance in the Far East (the so-called "Pacific Pact") which, if it materialized, could dominate the politics of East Asia as totally as NATO by this time dominated politics in Western Europe. Meanwhile, Chinese communism, the principal vehicle for an early extension of Soviet influence in Asia, remained an uncertain asset until the new regime was consolidated and the direction of Communist China's foreign policy was clearer. All these considerations suggested that a reappraisal of Soviet policies in Asia was due.

There were indications that these policies were under review before Stalin died—Moscow's active interest in the Southeast Asian rebellions, for instance, declined from 1951 on—but it fell to Stalin's heirs, Khrushchev in particular, to reverse his course. By 1955, the broad lines of Khrushchev's strategies in Asia had become clear. They may be summarized as follows: first, a positive and more sympathetic attitude toward Asian neutralism; secondly, economic assistance to selected neutrals with a view to making them less reliant on the West and more responsive to Soviet objectives; finally, opposition to American influence wherever the opportunity arose—that is, a "containment," in reverse.

Khrushchev's policies enjoyed a certain success and on the whole left Moscow in a stronger position in Asia (except, of course,

n China) than Stalin's policies had during the era of Zhdanovism.¹ Neutralism flourished in much of South and Southeast Asia and neutrals not infrequently supported Moscow on world issues. Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, was more sharply critical of Anglo-French intervention in the Suez crisis in 1956 than of simultaneous Soviet intervention in Hungary—the consequence, it may be imagined, of Moscow's new policies in India. Some neutralist countries, *soi-disant*, which early in the 1950's had leaned toward the United States, by the late 1950's were inclining more to Russia: for instance Indonesia, Burma and Cambodia. Washington, meanwhile, was checked in its efforts to devise a comprehensive alliance embracing all non-Communist nations in East Asia; when the alliance emerged, as SEATO, it included only two states in mainland Asia, Pakistan and Thailand, and was never the formidable instrument Soviet leaders once imagined. Moscow could take comfort, and Khrushchev could take pride, in the fact that these and similar gains were the consequence of revised strategies in Asia. In the space of half a decade the Russians had entirely recast the image of the U.S.S.R. in Asia and found it good enough to project in Africa and Latin America as well.

These successes were first marred and eventually compromised by Moscow's growing rivalry with China. Indeed, Khrushchev's successes were in some measure responsible for the rivalry, since they were precisely in those areas where Peking had its own aims and were not infrequently gained at China's expense. Soviet aid to India, for instance, inevitably meant less Soviet aid to China and strengthened China's natural rival for hegemony in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev's achievements, moreover, depended upon a moderation of traditional revolutionary strategies vigorously endorsed by the new Chinese leaders and still applicable, they felt, throughout the colonial and former colonial world.

¹ A. A. Zhdanov was one of Stalin's most powerful advisers, considered an inflexible opponent of the West and an ideological extremist. He died in 1948.—*Editor's note.*

As Sino-Soviet rivalry grew in intensity after 1960, emerging Asian nations were frequently compelled to choose not only between the Communist and non-Communist worlds but between the two Communist rivals as well. Indonesia, Cambodia and Burma, which, as we have seen, inclined to Moscow in the latter half of the 1950s, elected to gear their foreign policies to China's in the last years of Khrushchev's rule. In Asian countries where communism was legal—and even where it was not—local parties also inclined increasingly to Peking's leadership (as in Indonesia, New Zealand and Thailand) or at the very least divided into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions (as in India and Japan).

After early successes, then, Khrushchev's policies in Asia ran into growing difficulties in the 1960's because of rivalry with China. It would attach too great significance to Asia, in the context of Soviet affairs generally, to suggest that Khrushchev's policies there—even his dispute with Mao Tse-tung—were a major reason for his downfall. Nonetheless, his departure provided an opportunity to review these policies. Has the review in fact led to any significant shift in Soviet strategies?

"MODERATION" IN ASIA?

The central question facing Khrushchev's successors with respect to policies in Asia, we may imagine, has been whether his strategies could continue to yield dividends—through the infusion of more energy, or more funds, but within the framework of "peaceful co-existence"—or whether Moscow was compelled by Peking's posture to adopt policies more in keeping with the Soviet revolutionary heritage. Could Moscow succeed in Asia, in the face of Mao's China, by remaining moderate?

We should be able to discover how the new Soviet leaders have answered this question, at least thus far, by a sampling of their behavior in Asia. For this purpose we shall select Soviet policies in India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Japan and—most critically—Vietnam. China is left outside our direct consideration, obviously not because the Sino-Soviet relationship is of no consequence to Moscow's strate-

gies elsewhere in Asia but, on the contrary, because it stands above them; it is too large a variable to fit into any configuration of Soviet Asian policy we can reasonably construct here. Suffice it to note that after Khrushchev's fall public manifestation of the rivalry abated long enough to permit several encounters between high Soviet and Chinese officials (during Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow in November, 1964, for instance, and Aleksei Kosygin's two brief stopovers in Peking in February, 1965) and the first important upswing in planned trade between the two countries since 1959. Following the Russian-sponsored conference of Communist parties in March, however, and the clashes between Soviet police and Chinese students occurring at that time, rivalry resumed in earnest. By the summer of 1965 the dispute had reached an intensity not markedly different from that of the preceding two summers when Khrushchev was still in power in the Kremlin.

INDIA AS BELLWETHER

The bellwether country in Asia as far as Soviet policy is concerned is *India*. This country was the original recipient of Russian aid in Asia, in 1955, and relations between the two countries remained cordial since that time through all the uncertainties of recurrent world crises. Jawaharlal Nehru's death in May, 1964, caused some initial uneasiness in Moscow concerning the ability of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, to hold India together, but the uneasiness soon passed. In September, the state visit to Moscow of President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was occasion for an effusive reassertion of Soviet-Indian friendship. The communiqué marking the end of the visit showed the two countries in agreement on a variety of world issues, including disarmament, the United Nations, South Africa, the forthcoming Afro-Asian conference (where India was sponsoring Soviet participation) and, of course, peaceful coexistence. Had Khrushchev's successors wished to give a sign—to Peking especially

—that Soviet policies in Asia were shifting they would have given it in India.

There was no such sign. Within a fortnight of Khrushchev's fall, Anastas Mikoyan assured Indian officials in Moscow that no change was envisaged in Soviet aid policies in India. The relevant agreements, he explained, including the agreements for military aid, had been made with the Soviet government, not with Khrushchev, and would remain in force. In November, 1964, a new Soviet-Indian trade protocol was announced showing an increase in total volume of nearly 50 per cent over the preceding year. In January, 1965, a series of articles in the Soviet press commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of Indian independence culminated in the announcement that negotiations had been completed for Soviet construction of a "second Bhilai" steel plant at Bokaro—negotiations begun while Khrushchev was in power and concluded by his successors. In February, 1965, the tenth anniversary of Soviet aid to India was the occasion of further reaffirmation of Soviet-Indian ties.

Exchange of high-level visitors between the two countries, meanwhile, continued. In November, the Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh, visited Moscow. In December, B. N. Ponomarev, a member of the Secretariat of the C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), went to New Delhi for the Seventh Congress of the C.P.I. (Communist Party of India). This was hardly a state visit, of course, but the very presence of so high a Russian official at the congress assured Shastri's government of Moscow's intention to urge moderation on the factious Indian Communists; the congress in fact passed a resolution, perhaps inspired by Ponomarev, approving India's posture of non-alignment.² The chairman of the C.P.I.'s National Council gave similar assurances in published interviews during a visit to Moscow in January. In March, a delegation from the Supreme Soviet visited India. And in May Shastri himself spent eight days in the U.S.S.R. in accordance with an agreement to exchange visits between the Indian and Soviet premiers announced earlier in the

² *Pravda*, December 25, 1964.

year. He was received with much ceremony and enthusiasm (the more so because his visit to the United States scheduled immediately following the Soviet visit had been "postponed" at President Lyndon Johnson's request).

The subsequent Soviet-Indian communiqué again showed the two nations in accord on many world issues, including condemnation of American bombing in North Vietnam. Details were not immediately made known concerning the economic discussions carried on during Shastri's visit but it was reliably reported that the Indian premier won pledges of substantial Soviet support for India's new Five Year Plan—possibly doubling the amount of Soviet aid given the plan just completed. If so, this would mean a new Soviet outlay in India of approximately \$1.5 billion between 1965 and 1970. Surely this record reveals no significant shift, and above all no cooling, in Soviet-Indian relations.

INDONESIA AND CAMBODIA

In *Indonesia*, the basic pattern of relations between Moscow and Djakarta also remains unchanged since Khrushchev's fall. Soviet support of President Sukarno's "confrontation" policy in Malaysia, for instance, was clearly articulated during Mikoyan's visit to Indonesia in June, 1964, reiterated in the joint Soviet-Indonesian communiqué ending Sukarno's visit to Russia in September and has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions since the change of regime in October, 1964. The recent nationalization policies of the Djakarta government, meanwhile, have been favorably reported in the Soviet press, as has the steady deterioration in American-Indonesian relations since the beginning of the year. Even Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, which Moscow did not endorse, was reported and "explained" to Soviet readers without prejudice. No new aid or trade agreements were announced through June, 1965, but there has been no indication that existing agreements (including an arms agreement negotiated during General A. H. Nasution's visit to Moscow in September, 1964, that brought the total value

of Russian aid to Indonesia to over \$3 billion) have been suspended.

It is plausibly argued, nonetheless, because there is little sustained evidence of cordiality between the two states, that Soviet-Indonesian relations have in fact cooled slightly during the past year. If this is so, it is due not to any conscious shift in Moscow's attitude toward Indonesia but rather to a perceptible swing of the Indonesians toward China, especially on the part of the now confessed pro-Communist Foreign Minister Subandrio. It is apparent that Subandrio's visit to Peking in January, 1965, was more profitable politically than his visit to Moscow the month before, both with respect to "confrontation" in Malaysia and to Djakarta's withdrawal from the United Nations. Indonesia's drift toward China in any case has been in progress now for several years; it does not appear to have been either accelerated or retarded by any change in Soviet policies since Khrushchev.

Soviet policy has been equally consistent in *Cambodia*. On national holidays and other appropriate anniversaries, since Khrushchev's fall as before, routine but cordial greetings have been exchanged between Moscow and Phnom Penh. Both Khrushchev and his successors have periodically underscored Cambodia's protests over American-South Vietnamese violations of her territory in pursuit of the Vietcong and have supported Prince Sihanouk's frequent pleas for an international conference to guarantee Cambodian neutrality, like the Geneva conference on Laos in 1962. In April, 1965, the Soviet Union formally proposed to Great Britain, coguarantor of the 1954 Geneva protocol on Indochina, that such a conference be convened. The purpose of the conference, however, became almost immediately clouded by unexpected American-British interest in it as a means of exploring a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Apparently on Peking's urging, Sihanouk reversed his position and declined to take part in a conference on Cambodia "which would only serve as a pretext for talks on Vietnam;" Moscow obligingly muted its earlier enthusiasm.

By summer, the likelihood of the Cambodian conference seemed as remote as ever, but the attitude of the new Soviet leaders towards it was unambiguous: they, no less than Khrushchev, were prepared to follow Phnom Penh's wishes and oblige a minor Asian ally. The fact that a conference on Cambodia required little in the way of a Soviet commitment and was not likely to affect Soviet interests, however it might turn out, made it that much easier for Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev.

RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Soviet relations with *Japan* fall into a different pattern since Japan is not a self-styled neutral in world affairs. The Japanese leadership is openly pro-American on most issues and public opinion in Japan, if asked to choose between Russia and China, would doubtless choose China. Moscow's continuing efforts to court Japan, therefore, reflect another dimension of Soviet moderation in Asia and emphasize again the similarities between Khrushchev's policies and those of his successors.

Broadly described, these policies are relatively flexible with respect to increased trade and improved diplomatic contacts, but unyielding in such matters as Japanese military and naval collaboration with the United States. A series of warnings in the Soviet press on the danger of Japan's allowing United States Polaris submarines in its ports and of servicing the United States Seventh Fleet continued without change during October and November, 1964, while the reorganization of the Soviet government was proceeding. In March, 1965, in the same vein, the Soviet Foreign Office chided Japan for permitting its bases to be used for the transshipment of American troops to Vietnam and considered this "inconsistent" with Tokyo's professed desire for peace in Southeast Asia. These warnings, however, were firm but not belligerent, and appear not to have blunted Moscow's cordial greetings to the Japanese on official occasions: note, for instance, Kosygin's congratulations to the new Japanese premier, Eisaku Sato, in November, 1964, and a flood

of messages and editorial comment in January on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations (a landmark less ostentatiously celebrated in previous years).

The issue of the Kurile Islands, always sensitive to the Japanese, also figured prominently in Soviet-Japanese relations during 1964 and 1965. In July, 1964, in an interview with Japanese Socialists, Mao Tse-tung argued that the Kuriles, which were awarded to Russia following the Yalta conference in 1945, should be returned to Japan (and he hinted that China might one day present its "own account" for other Russian seizures in the past, including Vladivostok and Kamchatka). Khrushchev's reply, delivered to a Japanese parliamentary delegation in Moscow in September of that year was blunt—but not unfriendly: the Kuriles, he affirmed, belonged to Russia and no Chinese logic could alter the fact. His successors have periodically reiterated this view in the same vein, unequivocally but without malice.

No shift in Russian policies in Japan can be detected in this record of Soviet-Japanese relations since Khrushchev. The same conclusion, it is worth noting, has also been reached by Japanese Communists, who decided as early as December, 1964 (according to an editorial in the official J.C.P. [Japanese Communist Party] organ *Akahata*), that the new Soviet leaders were "continuing the subversive activity of the Khrushchev era" and were no friends of Japan.

THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM

In most parts of Asia, to judge from the foregoing evidence, Soviet policy experienced no sharp change as the result of Khrushchev's overthrow. Peaceful coexistence remained in force. Old friendships were reaffirmed, doubtful ones were strengthened where possible, new prospects were explored. Only in *Vietnam* has there been a significant shift in Soviet Asian strategies—either in consequence of Khrushchev's departure or because of the course of events in Vietnam itself.

It should be remarked at the outset that Khrushchev grew progressively less interested

in Vietnam during the last years of his rule. His public statements on the Vietnam issue after 1962 were infrequent and the Soviet press, while of course sympathetic to the Vietcong efforts in South Vietnam and critical of American intervention, devoted relatively little attention to the course of the war itself. Even the American bombing of North Vietnamese coastal installations following the attack on United States naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in August, 1964, occasioned only brief concern in Moscow, to judge from coverage in Soviet periodicals. By October, when Khrushchev was toppled from power, attention to Vietnamese affairs in the Russian press was as meager as at any time since the Geneva conference of 1954. This decline of interest in Vietnam, we may imagine, was due to Khrushchev's acknowledgement, as Sino-Soviet rivalry grew, that Vietnam was too far away from Moscow and too close to Peking to deserve a more sustained effort.

What could be the *object* of such an effort? To support Hanoi and the Vietcong more vigorously would only help Peking in the long run. To urge an end to the fighting through a negotiated settlement would leave Moscow further exposed to Peking's charges of inadequate leadership in world affairs and would risk the further loss of Soviet prestige in the world Communist movement. It was wiser, Khrushchev appears to have felt, to keep Soviet involvement in Vietnam to a minimum.

The decision of the new Soviet leadership in January, 1965, to send a high-ranking Russian delegation to Hanoi, headed by Aleksei Kosygin himself, marked a significant shift in Soviet strategies. At the very least, this decision, and the visit itself, asserted a fresh Soviet interest in Southeast Asia and engaged Moscow once again in the most persistent problem in world affairs since World War II. The Soviet leaders may well have felt, after discussions with Chou En-lai in Moscow in November, 1964, that no early resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute was likely and that therefore a renewed Soviet interest in Vietnam would not jeopardize any

détente with China. Meanwhile, the temporary lull in Sino-Soviet polemics made it possible to arrange the trip with minimum interference from Peking. It is not clear how firm a commitment to the Vietnamese Kosygin planned before he reached Hanoi.

Events in any case forced his hand. The abrupt escalation of the war during Kosygin's visit, in consequence of the American decision to bomb military targets in North Vietnam, elicited a promise of immediate Soviet aid. "The U.S.S.R.," the joint communiqué of February 11 asserted, "will not remain indifferent to ensuring the security of a fraternal, socialist country and will give the D.R.V. [Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North)] the necessary aid and support." The phrasing in the communiqué, to be sure, was identical with phrases used in previous Soviet statements on Vietnam after Khrushchev's fall (for instance, a *Tass* release on November 27, Kosygin's first report to the Supreme Soviet on December 9, and a statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko on December 30) but now a special urgency attached to the words "necessary aid and support."

The details of Soviet aid were worked out during negotiations in Moscow in mid-April between Russian officials and a North Vietnamese delegation led by Le Duan. By the end of May, following delays apparently caused by the Chinese, Soviet military supplies began to reach North Vietnam in significant volume, including jet fighters and ground-to-air missiles which became operational around Hanoi by early summer. There have even been periodic threats to send Russian "volunteers" to Vietnam, but these are not widely believed.

Military assistance to Hanoi has made the Vietnam question central to Soviet policy, a development Khrushchev sought conscientiously to avoid. Meanwhile, a *solution* to the problem is no easier for Khrushchev's successors than it was for him. The same dilemma exists, now compounded by Soviet involvement. Russia becomes more and more committed to a cause it cannot support wholeheartedly, for success benefits only China. No skill in Soviet diplomacy can alter the

geography of Southeast Asia and the virtual certainty that the Communist-controlled portions of this region, through proximity to China, will be more responsive to Peking than to Moscow. Thus the Russians are faced with the delicate task of delivering enough aid to Vietnam to check American gains but not so much that Hanoi, on the strength of Russian aid, will be tempted to undertake maneuvers that risk further escalation.

In the matter of negotiations, the Russians must be careful not to appear so eager for them that the credibility of Soviet aid is destroyed, yet constructive enough to bring the Vietnamese issue eventually to the conference table. Above all, Moscow's actions must disprove such charges as Peking began once again to make in March:

The new leaders of the Soviet Communist Party are now loudly proclaiming their support for the revolutionary struggle of the people of South Vietnam but in reality they are trying to gain political capital for their dealings with U.S. imperialists and to carry out plots for "peace talks," in a futile attempt to extinguish the revolutionary struggle of the South Vietnamese people.³

Meanwhile, Soviet-American relations, whose improvement both Washington and Moscow were confidently predicting early in 1965, have worsened. In keeping with its new posture in Vietnam, Moscow felt obliged to reject as "noisy propaganda" and "impudent demagoguery" President Johnson's proposals in April for "unconditional negotiations" in Vietnam.⁴ In June, the Soviet leaders rejected the Commonwealth Peace Mission to Vietnam which the Americans supported. From the Russian viewpoint, the most unfortunate aspect of the Vietnam affair is that as long as the crisis continues, progress is blocked on other problems whose resolution depends upon improved relations between East and West: a settlement in Berlin, for instance, or in Germany; increased trade between Eastern Europe and the Common Market; disarmament—indeed, any of the multiple issues still surviving from the cold war. However much Moscow may hope for

a solution in Vietnam that would check both the United States and China, it must be understood that Soviet foreign policy has more at stake elsewhere in the world. The Russians have frustrated no one but themselves by being drawn so deeply into the war in Vietnam.

In sum, the Asian policies of Khrushchev's successors are both a continuation of his policies and a departure from them. Policies founded on peaceful coexistence have continued in force in countries where they had proved effective before and, generally, where local governments were stable enough to allow the development of useful state-to-state relations. The departure occurred in Vietnam where an early decision to reassert Moscow's influence led, through the coincidence of Kosygin's visit to Hanoi and a sudden, unforeseen escalation of the Vietnamese war, to a Soviet commitment far beyond any presumably contemplated by the new Russian leaders. With regard to continuities and shifts in Soviet policy, it is worth noting that Brezhnev and Kosygin have had less freedom than their predecessors in choosing between alternate courses. Lenin, Stalin and even Khrushchev, when he came to power, did not have to weigh too carefully the acceptability of this or that policy to allies; if Moscow determined on a given line it was assured of support by Communists everywhere. The present Soviet leaders, by contrast, are circumscribed by the opinions of their fellow-Communists. A shift from moderation to militancy, for instance—comparable to Stalin's shift to Zhdanovism in 1947—has not

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³ *People's Daily*, March 22, 1965.

⁴ *Pravda*, April 10, 1955, and *Izvestia*, April 28, 1965.

Noting that "The root of Soviet trouble lies deeper than in mere personalities," this economist points out that "Marxist-Leninist dogmatism prevents the Communist leaders from admitting that collectivization is the cause of the plight of agriculture and that public ownership of all means of production and the mammoth growth of industry have created a situation that the party and the government are unable to control."

Economic Policies After Khrushchev

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

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THE DRAMATIC REMOVAL of Nikita Khrushchev which deprived the Communist world of its most picturesque leader is still too recent to allow an authoritative factual analysis of its causes and effects. Nevertheless, in spite of Soviet reticence on questions of internal change, enough information is available to justify some tentative conclusions. Needless to say, the official version—Khrushchev's voluntary retirement on the grounds of "advanced age and ill health" (ironically, the decree releasing him of the duties of chairman of the Council of Ministers was signed by A. Mikoyan, Khrushchev's junior by a few months)—carried little conviction.

Since his dismissal, Khrushchev has not been mentioned in the Soviet press or in the pronouncements of Soviet spokesmen, but his alleged failings are frequently and unmistakably spelled out in generalized didactic terms. The pattern of the indictment was set in a *Pravda* editorial of October 18, 1964.

The Leninist party [wrote the Communist organ] is an enemy of subjectivism and drift in Communist construction. Hairbrained scheming (*prozhektorstvo*); half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions . . . ; bragging and bluster; lust for rule by fiat; disregard for practical and scientific experience—these are alien to the party. The building up of communism . . . does not tolerate armchair methods, one-man decisions,

disregard for the practical experience of the masses.

This is the basic theme of anti-Khrushchevism, embroidered upon in innumerable variants. Khrushchev, unlike his immediate predecessors in office—Georgi Malenkov and Nikolai Bulganin—was not charged with anti-party activities or political crimes. It is believed that he continues to reside in Moscow but he is hardly ever seen in public, although he voted in the local elections of March, 1965. His downfall was accompanied by few proscriptions on the upper government and party level, but the remodeling of the party and administrative structures provided presumably ample opportunity for the replacement of hostile or lukewarm officials by reliable supporters of the new regime. Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law, was dismissed from his post as editor of *Izvestia*. The practice of foreign relations has returned to the stiff pre-1953 model, the families of the new leaders being relegated to the frigid anonymity of the Stalin era. The days when an ebullient Nikita Sergeyevich took his wife, children and in-laws on much publicized colorful junkets in foreign lands are over. Under the current dispensation, these would be regarded as manifestations of "subjectivism."

Khrushchev's successors were his close po-

litical associates, a situation which has an immediate bearing on the subject of this article. Leonid Brezhnev, who in October, 1964, became first secretary of the Communist party, is a former senior secretary of the Central Committee of the party and worked with Khrushchev for a quarter of a century. Aleksei Kosygin, the new chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, was the first deputy-chairman of that body when Khrushchev headed it. This being the case, a sharp reversal of foreign or domestic policies was not to be expected. The broad issues inevitably remained the same as under Khrushchev and the approach to their solution has not been basically altered, although specific measures of the Khrushchev era have been severely criticized, and some have been repealed. The decisions of the twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second party congresses (held, respectively, in 1956, 1959 and 1961, and dominated by Khrushchev), as well as the new (1961) party program—another Khrushchev brain child—are extolled as the depository of the Marxist-Leninist revelation and an unfailing guide to action.

The revision of Khrushchevian policies was undertaken by the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Communist party in October and November, 1964, and in March, 1965. Some of it dealt with the vital question of remodeling the structure of party and administrative agencies with which this article is not concerned. As was to be expected, recent measures of economic policy hold elements of both continuity and change.

OFFICIAL REPORTS

The overall picture of Soviet economic and social development is provided by a variety of sources of which the more important are the periodic reports on the fulfillment of the plan, the annual budget speeches of the minister of finance, the pronouncements of other Soviet leaders, and the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet and other bodies. The planned assignments, according to the fulfillment reports, are almost invariably overfulfilled. In 1964, the sixth year of the seven-year plan, the official economic indexes (social

product, national income, industrial and agricultural output, capital investment, trade, labor productivity, and so on) showed an increase of from 4 per cent (real income of the population, number of workers employed) to as much as 18 per cent (labor productivity on collective and state farms) over the respective figures for 1963.

These indexes, however, should be used with the greatest caution. That of the 1964 gross agricultural output, for instance, was given as 12 per cent above the 1963 level, seemingly a creditable performance which, however, as it will appear below, did not prevent a severe shortage of agricultural commodities: 1963 was a year of exceptionally low agricultural yields. The 1964 fulfillment report itself refers to the critical condition of animal husbandry: from 1962 through 1964 the number of cattle remained almost stationary at 87 million while that of pigs declined from 70 million to 52.8 million. The number of sheep and poultry was also substantially reduced.

The fulfillment report for the first quarter of 1965, the latest one available at this writing, follows the established pattern but does not deal with agriculture although it quotes figures for several farm products, (butter, milk products, cheese). The picture of economic growth which it discloses expressed in terms of percentage increases over the previous year is impressive. So are the absolute figures of the expansion of output under the Soviet planned economy: the output of coal rose from 35.5 million tons in 1928 to 554 million in 1964; the corresponding figures for pig iron are 3.3 million and 62.4 million tons, for steel, 4.3 and 85 million tons, and for oil, 11.7 million and 224 million tons.

Like Khrushchev, his successors talk with some justification of the "majestic" progress of the Soviet economy. Yet, as under Khrushchev, official pronouncements are replete with denunciations of inefficiency, mismanagement and failures to meet the planned assignments. These laments have been especially strident in recent months and would seem to overstep the bounds of traditional "self-criticism." The one novel departure is that "subjectiv-

m" has come to play an increasingly important part as an explanation of the woes that plague the Soviet economy.

Since the inception of the Soviet regime agriculture has been and still remains a recalcitrant and unmanageable segment of the economy. Khrushchev often spoke of the low yields of crops, technical backwardness, and other disorders of Soviet farming.¹ Brezhnev and Kosygin are similarly critical and discriminatory. "In recent years the plan assignments that have been established for agriculture have not been fulfilled," Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet on December 9, 1964:

Serious mistakes were made in agricultural management, violation of the principle of material incentives for collective farmers, fascination with administration by fiat, constant organizational changes—all this had a harmful effect on the state of agriculture. . . . The lag in farming as a whole, especially in animal husbandry, has not yet been overcome.

Brezhnev spoke at great length about the agricultural situation at the plenary session of the Central Committee on March 24, 1965.

We are faced with the fact that in the last few years agriculture has slowed in its development, and our plans for an upsurge in agricultural production remained unfulfilled [he said]. According to the control figures, the gross output of agriculture during the seven-year plan (1959–1965) should have risen by 70 per cent; in fact, during the first six years the increase came to only 10 per cent.

Brezhnev claimed that the September, 1953, plenary session of the Central Committee devised a "correct" farming policy and that agriculture was making good progress up to 1959 (an optimistic view not supported by evidence) but that a decline set in after that year. He ascribed the reversal to disregard for the "economic laws of socialism;" to decisions of a "purely spontaneous nature," particularly in questions of planning, price formation, financing and credit; to "numerous and sometimes ill-conceived reorganizations which created an atmosphere of nervousness and confusion" and undermined the authority of farm managers; to the inadequacy of agri-

cultural investments; to the neglect or ignorance of scientific methods of farming; and to the failure of party and state agency to provide the collective and state farms with proper guidance.

The true villain of the piece was Khrushchevian "subjectivism." Alleged overemphasis on corn and the exploitation of virgin lands was severely criticized, as was the tendency to convert collective farms into state farms. According to Brezhnev, "it must be assumed that these two types of communal farming will continue to develop and exist for a long time." He insisted that the amalgamation of collective farms went too far—their number declined from 55,000 in 1959 to 39,500 in 1964; some of them became so large as "to prove unmanageable." The modernization of farming calls for advanced technology but this has often been perverted. Brezhnev castigated:

erroneous theories and dogmas that arose without adequate scientific foundation. . . . Science does not tolerate subjectivism and overhasty conclusions that have not been verified in practice. . . . Unfortunately in recent times there have been instances when scientifically incompetent people have sometimes assumed the rôle of arbitrator in disputes between scientists and . . . thus prevented the free, creative discussion of scientific problems.

AGRICULTURAL PREDICAMENT

The seriousness of the predicament of Soviet agriculture is confirmed by the fact that the import of grain from abroad which took place in 1963 was continued, although on a reduced scale, in 1964–1965. It was reliably reported that between October, 1964, and February, 1965, the U.S.S.R. bought 700,000 tons of grain in Canada, 250,000 tons in France, and 150,000 tons in Belgium; the price, exclusive of freight, was estimated at \$70 million. There were also massive purchases of soya beans in the United States, of wool in Australia, and of cattle in various European countries. It is believed, however, that some of the grain bought abroad by the Russians was shipped to Cuba.

The March, 1965, plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist party

¹ See, for instance, *Current History*, Vol. 47, No. 79 (November, 1964), pp. 267, 268.

was devoted to agriculture and framed a comprehensive program of measures designed to increase the productivity of farm labor, bring higher yields, and raise the living standards of the rural community. These measures were immediately made effective by decrees of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. The essential features of this lengthy, complex, and in part technical legislation may be summarized as follows. The volume of annual purchases of grain and other agricultural commodities by the state under the procurement system (that is, obligatory sales to government agencies by the collective farms and the state farms) was lowered. In the case of grain the reduction was from 4,000 million *puds* to 3,400 million *puds* (55.7 million tons). The annual figure of procurement was to remain "fixed and unalterable" through 1970.

The basic procurement prices for grain, meat and other agricultural commodities were raised. For grain the increase, which varied from region to region, was from 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Basic procurement prices were further increased for sales to the state in excess of the planned quotas; for wheat and rye the increment was to be 50 per cent. The object of the revised price policy was to foster higher output by making every branch of husbandry profitable. Farm administration was to expand the area of meadows and pastures. The reduction of the volume of grain procurement, by easing the pressure of the demand for grain, should facilitate this objective.

Within the framework of the national procurement plan, local party and state agencies would prepare detailed annual plans, covering the years 1965-1970, for the sale to the state of specific amounts of agricultural commodities. These plans were to be determined by the conditions of each enterprise—soil, climate, economic features, and so on. Such plans would be subject to change. According to Brezhnev, "when we say that the plan has the force of law, then it is mandatory for everyone. It cannot be changed and it cannot go unfulfilled." Stalin would seem to have taken a more realistic view, one more in line with Soviet practice, when he told the

sixteenth congress of the party in 1930 that a plan is only "a first approximation, which must be refined, amended, and improved in the light of local experience, in the light of experience gained in carrying out the plan."

The March program stipulated the strengthening of the technical base of farming by investing 71,000 million rubles in agriculture, for 1966-1970. The production of agricultural machinery, including tractors, will be greatly increased and some 200 new plants and 1,000 specialized shops will be built to take care of their maintenance. Agriculture will be guided by science; biologists and other experts will be given the recognition and reward that they deserve. Collective farm "democracy" admittedly does not function well and the obsolete Collective Farm Statute of 1935, still in force, will be replaced by a new statute to be drafted by the third congress of collective farmers scheduled for 1966. Earlier decrees (November, 1964) repealing the "unjustified restrictions" imposed after 1955 on the size of household allotments and the number of cattle owned privately by the collective farmers. Contrary to the earlier policy, the auxiliary husbandry of the collective farm members and others (workers and employees) is to be assisted and encouraged.

The financial measures of the March program brought much needed relief to the rural community and, incidentally, confirmed the worst suspicions concerning the financial difficulties of the collective farms. Their entire indebtedness was written off. It comprised 2,010 million rubles owed to the State Bank and another 120 million rubles for the equipment purchased by the farms from the machine tractor stations when the latter were disbanded in 1958. The basis of the assessment of the collective farm income tax was changed and its rates were cut down by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of April 10, 1965. Additional incentives for farm workers and officials was provided by a revised system of bonuses for the fulfillment and the overfulfillment of the plan. Finally, the prices of goods widely used in the countryside were lowered.

Soviet leaders have high hopes for the

success of this program and count on the enthusiastic response of the rural community. It remains to be seen whether these expectations are justified. The program, while impressive as a massive attempt at obtaining higher productivity, contains no ideas that were not tried, without conspicuous success, during the four decades that have elapsed since the beginning of collectivization. Its true significance lies, perhaps, in the official recognition of the plight of farming. As to its remedial policies, they do not seem to differ much, except in administrative details, from those of the Khrushchev and pre-Khrushchev era.

Lenin stated in 1920 that "communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country." Nearly half a century later, in March, 1965, Brezhnev told the Central Committee that "12 per cent of the collective farms do not have electricity even for illumination. Agriculture consumes only 4 per cent of the power generated in the country, including only 2 per cent for productive purposes." This is, indeed, a revealing statement.

INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS

In industry, the element of continuity between the Khrushchev and the post-Khrushchev era is even stronger than in agriculture. Official statistics, as indicated above, disclose a heartening record of fulfillment and overfulfillment of planned assignments by industry. As in the past, means of production are given priority over consumer goods, but the tendency—not a new one—is to narrow the gap between the two. Kosygin told the Supreme Soviet (December 9, 1964) that the increase in the output of means of production as a percentage of the output in the previous year, was 8.2 per cent in 1964 and should remain at that level in 1965, while the respective percentages of increase for consumer goods were 6.5 and 7.7. Garbuzov, the minister of finance, stated in his budget speech (December 9, 1964) that:

in 1965 expenditure on the development of industry will rise by 12.5 per cent and will amount to 41,100 million rubles. . . . Large sums will be allocated to the further development of heavy

industry, as the basis for the advancement of the entire national economy, for improving the well-being of the people, and for strengthening the country's defense capacity.

The largest growth in investments is planned for the chemical industry and the oil and gas industry—as it was under Khrushchev.

There is, however, a reverse side of the medal. As the number of enterprises multiply and industry grows bigger, the complexities of management increase and create problems for which no adequate solution has yet been found. Agencies in control of industry are perennially in a state of flux. In 1957, the management of industry was transferred from the ministries to the newly-created regional administrative economic councils while 25 of the 32 federal economic ministries were dissolved. The administrative economic councils, however, proved disappointing; their structure (there were originally 105 councils) was revised several times and their abolition is now under discussion. Meanwhile, a number of "state committees" which looked very much like the old ministries under a different name came into existence. They, too, soon fell from grace. In March, 1965, six of the state committees (for the aviation industry, for the defense industry, and so on) were actually reorganized as ministries; other reconversions are likely to follow and a restoration of the 1957 pattern of industrial control is not improbable.

The day-by-day management of industrial enterprises calls for drastic revision. There is a growing recognition of the stifling effect and many absurdities of the bureaucratic controls inherent in central planning. Pressure to meet planned assignments has resulted in the piling up of vast stocks of unneeded and unsalable goods, especially in the textile, clothing, and shoe industries. According to official data, in the autumn of 1964 the value of stock lying idle in the warehouses exceeded the planned figure by some 1,800 million rubles.

This situation led to a novel experiment in planning undertaken, with official approval, by two garment manufacturing concerns, Bolshevichka and Mayak. Their managers

were empowered to draw up their own production plans, after consultation with appropriate sales organizations. The guiding idea was that the volume and grades of the goods produced should meet the demands of the consumers. To put it bluntly, actual planning was to begin not at the top but at the bottom by ascertaining consumer preferences; then the production programs would move up through various planning agencies until they reached the State Planning Committee. It is not clear how the freedom of an enterprise in determining the assortment of the goods to be produced and their retail prices could be reconciled with centralized planning.

Nevertheless, the "direct factory-selling organizations relationship" found a measure of acceptance. It was announced at the end of 1964 that about one-third of the garment factories were to be shifted to the new system. The implementation of this program met with many difficulties and was slowed down. By the middle of 1965, according to *Pravda*, some 80 garment factories and 50 shoe factories were operating on the "direct relationship" principle. Other enterprises and other industries—textile, fur, leather, food—are said to be preparing to make the change.

The condition of industrial labor in 1965 remains about the same as in the previous year. Wages and social benefits have been somewhat raised and the five-day week was introduced in a few enterprises without, however, reducing the weekly number of hours. In some cases the transition proved difficult and the six-day week was restored. In 1965, there is no unemployment. But there are shortages of many kinds, the quality of goods is often exceedingly poor; and a severe housing shortage persists in spite of a massive housing program.

PLANNING DIFFICULTIES

Planning holds a central place in the Soviet economy and is the object of incessant attention by the government. Shortly before his downfall, Khrushchev delivered a lengthy homily on planning at a conference of party and state officials (*Pravda*, October 2, 1964). Some of his views, not very original, were

echoed by his successors: increased emphasis on consumer goods, the use of advanced technology, improvement in the quality of production, incentive wages, expansion of foreign trade. But his proposals for long-range planning seem to be held, at least temporarily, in abeyance. The seven-year plan now in effect, on completing its course at the end of 1965, will be succeeded by a traditional five-year plan. Nothing has transpired so far concerning the drafting of a plan for a longer period, although a passing reference to it was made by Kosygin.

The prevailing attitude towards planning was well summarized by E. M. Dymshits, a high government official. "The time when we pursued quantity at the expense of quality has passed," he said. "There is no longer room for the formal ostentatious fulfillment of the plan according to 'gross output.'" Kosygin examined the problems of planning in considerable detail in a speech before a large gathering of economic experts and officials (March 19, 1965). He stated that "when the seven-year plan and annual plans were being drafted, recommendations often came from above that bore a subjective nature and that frequently were in contradiction with the economic laws of socialism." Many of the difficulties in planning were the consequences of "economically illiterate solutions" imposed from above. However, "since the October plenary"—that is, since the dismissal of Khrushchev—"completely different . . . constructive conditions have been created." And again: "In the past and even now, planning has been marked with many errors. To

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Discussing problems of Soviet trade and aid, this specialist maintains that "Despite the initial advantages of a state monopoly of foreign trade directed by a combination of commercial and political interests, and the pretensions of Soviet propaganda . . . the U.S.S.R. is likely to find itself considerably less able than the West to satisfy the increasingly insistent demands of the less developed countries."

Soviet Trade and Aid

By MILTON KOVNER

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IN THE WEEKS following Khrushchev's ouster from power, concern was evident among many of the leaders of new states at his successors might assess unfavorably the political dividends which had accrued to the U.S.S.R. from more than a decade of foreign aid investment in the less developed world. Certainly the history of Communist ambivalence toward collaboration with and support for so-called "bourgeois-nationalist," non-Communist led, movements in colonial areas, provided adequate grounds for such anxiety.

In actuality, however, subsequent events and a survey of published Soviet materials have revealed an approach to the national liberation movement even more flexible and less fettered by doctrinal inhibitions than that expounded and practiced by Khrushchev. Indeed, ideological innovations introduced by the new leadership seem to provide more effective rationalization of Khrushchev's policy. This placed a higher priority on maintaining close state-to-state relations with existing nationalist regimes in less developed countries than on active support for local Communist parties. And Soviet foreign aid funds have continued to flow to such regimes at near record levels.

In its pursuit of a closer identification with the less developed world, the new regime has clearly sought to divest itself of some of the ideological restraints on Soviet policy imposed by its predecessor. The need for such reformulation may stem, in part, from the desire of the new leadership—in view of persistent Chinese and other Communist criticism of Khrushchev's general strategy in the less developed world—to establish more clearly the basis and rationale for large-scale Soviet economic, military and political support of regimes which can in no sense be regarded as Communist. It may also reflect a more wary and realistic appraisal (in the third world no less than on the home front, Khrushchev's grasp seemed always to exceed his reach) that socialist revolutions in such countries are not likely in the near future. Thus the U.S.S.R. has little alternative but to support existing regimes, even military dictatorships once anathema to Marxists, if it hopes to make any progress at all toward accomplishment of its objectives in the less developed world.

While the recent formulations do not essentially contradict those promulgated under Khrushchev, they appear to differ markedly in their emphasis. Soviet criticisms of Arab

nationalism have been muted¹ and the distinction between "scientific" and African variants of socialism have been blurred.² Of greater significance has been the new regime's *de jure* doctrinal endorsement of the Soviet Union's *de facto* collaboration with military rulers in Algeria, the U.A.R., Burma, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, and a further subordination of the role local Communists are to play, especially in countries ruled by a one-party nationalist movement. Khrushchev's innovation of the "national democratic state" (in which a ruling coalition of both Communists and "progressive" elements of the national bourgeoisie was to implement the transition of less developed countries to a "path of non-capitalist development," i.e., to socialism) has been retained as a relevant state form. Yet it has been evolved by the new leaders into a concept of "revolutionary democracy," under which the same objectives are to be accomplished but apparently without the active participation of either local Communists or the now "discredited" national bourgeoisie. In the process, the military in less developed countries have been "rehabilitated," removed from the most reactionary category of the bourgeoisie (where orthodox Marxism had consigned them),³ and declared the

"backbone of the revolutionary democratic forces." No longer are military officers to be "walled off from revolutionary processes underway among the people. The noble head of a patriot may beat beneath an army uniform."⁴

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATS

This current Communist assessment of the situation in the less developed world was summarized earlier this year in an authoritative article in *Pravda*. In it, the author maintained that while the national bourgeoisie can still play "some" role in a united front in several less developed countries, "experience shows that in the present phase of the revolution, the national bourgeoisie is unable to wage a resolute struggle against foreign and domestic reaction." In countries such as Algeria, the U.A.R., Burma, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, "where the bourgeoisie has failed where capitalism is discredited, where the people long for socialism but where . . . a strong working class has yet been formed and therefore no conditions for proletarian leadership yet exist," so-called revolutionary democrats have risen to power to fill the vacuum.

These revolutionary democrats, "who have assumed the historical mission of breaking with capitalism, carry out the same basic social and economic transformations that have been advocated for decades by Communists." In other words, "they develop the state sector in every way and deprive foreign monopolies of control over the economy; pursue 'a progressive and anti-imperial foreign policy,' establish 'friendly ties with the socialist countries,' undermine 'the economic positions of the local bourgeoisie,' and carry out 'important agrarian reforms and industrialization.' Hence, the author concluded, 'a country may pass to the non-capitalist path not only under the leadership of the working class but also under the leadership of the revolutionary democrats.'"⁵

Thus most Communist parties apparently have been advised by the new regime to abjure, at least for the present, any serious bid for power. Instead, they are enjoined to place their "ideology" and their cadre

¹ Perhaps Khrushchev had gone too far in counterposing Soviet and Pan-Arab nationalist aspirations in the U.A.R. in May, 1964. *New Times*, No. 22, (June 3, 1964), p. 4.

² A recent *Pravda* article disclaims as "absurd" suggestions that "scientific socialism" is in any conflict with the socialist aspirations of less developed countries. *Pravda*, June 4, 1965, p. 3.

³ Traditionally, the bourgeoisie was regarded by Marxists as comprising several categories or sections: (a) feudal remnants and militarists, (b) compradores, or those tied by business connections to foreign monopolies, (c) national bourgeoisie, and (d) petty-bourgeoisie. The first two groups were regarded as unequivocally reactionary; the latter two of varying, but generally doubtful, reliability.

⁴ K. Ivanov, "National-Liberation Movement and Non-Capitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5 (May, 1965), p. 63.

⁵ *Pravda*, January 31, 1965, p. 5. It is generally conceded in Soviet literature that revolutionary democracy is, for the time being, inapplicable to Latin America, "economically dominated by American imperialism." There, the U.S.S.R. will presumably continue to rely on the more traditional techniques of supporting and working through local Communist parties.

tempered and tested in battle" and "experienced in organizational and propaganda work," at the service of revolutionary democrats, such as Nasser, who are acknowledged in some sense socialist and who are presumably leading their countries along "non-capitalist" paths of economic and social development.⁶ Through their political, economic, and military support for such regimes, the socialist nations undertake to perform the functions of a "proletarian vanguard" for the working class in any country without its own proletarian vanguard, i.e., an effective Communist party. In probable anticipation of criticism from the Chinese Communists, who advocate a more militant and aggressive policy in less developed countries, Soviet ideologues argue that:

any other approach to the question would have doomed the emerging countries which—and they are in the majority—have either no working class or only a very weak one, to the sterile prospect of possibly waiting for the time when the working class will emerge and become the leading force, thus making its dictatorship possible. But this would be tantamount to recognizing the inevitability of the victory of capitalism in these countries.⁷

THE POLITICS OF SOVIET FOREIGN AID

It would be tempting to ignore the mixture of dialectics and prophecy which characterizes so much of Communist thinking with regard to the less developed world if it was not used to justify the large-scale Soviet investment of material and human resources designed to

weaken and ultimately eliminate Western influence in the developing countries around the world.

The Communists tirelessly affirm that political sovereignty for less developed countries, without economic independence from former colonial rulers, is nothing but an "illusion." Therefore, the Communists regard as the highest priority the severing of economic ties between less developed countries and the West. Only thus can they create an environment conducive to the transition of these less developed countries to socialism, and ultimately to the Soviet orbit. In the interim, with Soviet military assistance "the young states, which have chosen the path of independent development, are creating strong national armies and . . . they can equip them with modern weapons to defend their freedom and independence."⁸

Soviet economic aid serves to encourage existing socialist predispositions toward Soviet-oriented forms of economic and social organization, to promote the development of the state sector to the eventual exclusion of private enterprise, to enhance the growth of a class-conscious proletariat and, more immediately, to thwart Western efforts to rely on economic sanctions, i.e., economic blockage or boycott, to retain their positions and influence there. Finally, Soviet academic and other training programs for nationals of developing countries "deprive the imperialists of important levers of spiritual influence on the social life of the liberated countries and the dissemination of reactionary, anti-socialist ideas."⁹

Soviet policy makers, too, seem oddly captive to a traditional Marxist analysis which has maintained, against the weight of historical evidence, that "one of the main sources from which European capitalism draws its chief strength is to be found in the colonial possessions and dependencies. Without the control of the extensive markets and vast fields of exploitation in the colonies the capitalist powers cannot maintain their existence even for a short time."¹⁰ To deny to the West this most bountiful source of its profits and, by squeezing it into an ever narrowing sphere of

⁶ On April 25, 1965, in a move similar to one taken earlier by Algerian Communists, the Communist party in the U.A.R. announced its dissolution and its members were urged to join Nasser's Arab Socialist Union. In the following month, the Soviet slogans for May Day hailed the U.A.R., for the first time, as building a "national democratic state," adding its name to those of Ghana, Guinea and Mali, the only other states so recognized. The slogans have referred to Algeria for some time, as in the process of building a "people's democratic state."

⁷ *Kommunist*, No. 17 (November, 1964), pp. 30, 31 and 33.

⁸ V. Brykin, "The Young States: Conditions for Their Independence and Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 6 (June, 1964), p. 31.

⁹ *Kommunist*, No. 17 (November, 1964), p. 31.

¹⁰ *Theses and Statutes of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress* (Moscow, 1920), p. 75.

economic activity, to hasten its collapse, has remained an accepted basis for Communist strategy and tactics in the less developed areas.¹¹

SCOPE OF THE AID PROGRAM

New economic aid commitments by Communist countries in 1964 of \$1.5 billion (of which the Soviet Union accounted for more than \$800 million) rose sharply above the levels of the two previous years (\$325 million and \$360 million in 1962 and 1963, respectively) and attained their highest total since the Communist aid program began more than a decade ago. During the period 1954-1964, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Communist China committed about \$6.4 billion

in economic credits and grants to 34 less developed countries;¹² the U.S.S.R. extended some \$4.2 billion or about two-thirds of the total Communist aid commitment, Eastern Europe, about \$1.4 billion and Communist China, less than \$800 million.

There has been a wide gap, however, between such Communist economic aid pledges and actual aid disbursements. Cumulative expenditures under Communist aid credits through 1964 totaled little more than \$2 billion, of which the U.S.S.R. has delivered about \$1.5 billion in goods and services, Eastern Europe, \$400 million and Communist China, only \$130 million. Aid expenditures have been rising steadily in recent years however, and are currently running at about \$50 million a year.¹³

In addition to economic aid, Communist countries have extended about \$3.5 billion worth of military equipment in credits to 14 less developed countries, often at substantial discounts and some as outright grants. Such aid has ranged from obsolescent small arms, tanks and planes, to items of more advanced technical design such as TU-16 jet medium bombers, MIG-21 jet aircraft and tactical anti-air defense missiles. The U.S.S.R. has accounted for the bulk of Communist military aid, with annual Soviet deliveries of military equipment in recent years running at about \$500 million.¹⁴

Except for a few grants, comprising about 5 per cent of the total program, Soviet and East European economic aid has been extended in the form of nonconvertible interest-bearing credits providing for the delivery of goods and services exclusively by the donor countries. Such credits are designed to cover the foreign exchange costs of Communist aided projects and, as a rule, are earmarked to cover expenditures for geological survey and feasibility studies, the delivery of machinery and equipment and other goods, technical assistance and technical training in the donor country. Soviet credits generally bear a low interest rate, well publicized and relatively low interest rate of 2.5 per cent and as a rule call for repayment of the principal over a period of 10 years, to begin one year after the completion

¹¹ A more recent formulation sets forth the thesis in the following terms: "The imperialists declare that they no longer need colonies and are not interested in exploiting less developed countries because these countries are losing their importance as sources of raw materials, markets for goods, spheres of capital exports. . . . These assertions are not in accord with reality. First, raw materials have not lost their significance. . . . Second, . . . monopoly capitalism, incapable of solving the problem of sales at home, strives for expansion in foreign markets . . . primarily the less developed ones. Third, . . . as long as there is a colossal difference in the price of labor, land, etc., between the former colonies and the metropolitan countries, the desire of the monopolies to keep these countries as spheres of capital investment and sources of cheap labor will inevitably persist. *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniye*, No. 12 (December, 1964), p. 90.

¹² Aggregate data on foreign aid excludes the roughly \$1.5 billion in economic assistance and \$600 in military aid extended by Communist countries to Cuba. U.S. Department of State, *The Communist Economic Offensive Through 1964*, RSB-65, August 4, 1965, p. 21.

¹³ U.S. Agency for International Development, *Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1966* (March 1965), p. 179. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1965*, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, Part I, p. 35; and U.S. Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 3. The Soviet Union and its East European allies have also extended aid to developing countries indirectly through nominal contributions to the funds of such U.N. agencies as the U.N. Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the U.N. Special Fund. In 1963, Soviet pledges to these agencies totaled about \$3.5 million (all in nonconvertible rubles) and amounted to less than 3 per cent of the total. By comparison, U.S. pledges of more than \$52 million in that year accounted for about 40 per cent of the total.

¹⁴ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016*, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 141.

of the project.¹⁵ In most cases, repayments of the principal and the interest can be made in the form of the traditional exports of the recipient country and, in some instances, with goods produced by the enterprises established with Communist aid.

The disproportionately large amount of publicity accorded to Communist aid efforts, however, has been a tribute more to the skill with which its propaganda value has been exploited than to its size which is, on the whole, still rather modest compared to Western aid. Moreover, Communist foreign aid has been highly concentrated in a few key sectors of the strategic landscape. During the postwar period, the United States has extended about \$40 billion in economic aid to

87 less developed countries. The U.S.S.R., a relative late starter in the foreign aid field, has, since 1954, pledged some \$4.2 billion in economic assistance to 29 less developed countries of which more than 70 per cent has been extended to five countries—India, the U.A.R., Afghanistan, Indonesia and Algeria. (See Table I on the following page.)

During the period 1954–1963, the industrial nations of the West disbursed about \$42 billion in economic aid to developing countries, or more than 20 times the aid actually provided by all the Communist countries. If we include the transfer of private investment funds (which although not aid in the strictest sense of the term, nevertheless contribute to economic development), then the net flow of long-term financial resources from the West was roughly 30 times that from the Communist orbit.¹⁶

SOVIET TRADE

¹⁵ Despite some shift in emphasis in United States foreign aid from grants to loans, and from loans repayable in local currency to loans repayable in dollars and despite an increase in the minimum interest rate, the bulk of United States loans are made on concessional terms (i.e., at a low interest rate with a long repayment period). In 1963, the weighted average maturity of United States bilateral loan commitments was 33 years with a weighted average interest rate of 2 per cent. The U.S.S.R. has not been loathe to accept the credit for the generally "soft" terms of United States foreign aid, maintaining: "Under pressure from the economic cooperation between the socialist and newly emergent countries, the capitalist countries are being compelled to make concessions to the young states or even seriously alter the terms of economic aid they are giving. . . . Evidently this has forced the USA . . . to lower . . . interest rates for credit facilities to the developing countries and prolong the terms of repayment." A. Gatsoyev, *et al.*, "Two System Competition and the Young States," *International Affairs*, No. 9 (September, 1964), p. 80.

¹⁶ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, *Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1964 Review* (O.E.C.D., 1964), p. 105. Although credit commitments from Communist countries have accounted for a relatively small share of the total aid received by less developed countries from all sources, for many countries such credits do represent a significant share of expenditures for capital investment. According to Soviet sources, for example, Soviet credit commitments to India represented about 12 per cent of total investment in the public sector scheduled for the third five year plan, 1961–1966, and to Indonesia, approximately 15 per cent of planned public investment in 1961–1968. Soviet credit commitments to Afghanistan are reported to have covered almost one-third of total investment during the country's first five year plan, 1956–1961, and in Mali Soviet credits accounted for 20 per cent of planned capital investment during the period 1961–1965. *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 34 (August 22, 1964), p. 20.

¹⁷ *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 2 (February, 1965), p. 72.

In its efforts to reverse the classical doctrine of "trade follows the flag," and under the stimulus of almost a decade of aggressive trade promotion and large-scale economic aid, Soviet trade with the less developed world has registered an impressive expansion. In 1955, Soviet trade with the developing countries was less than \$325 million and amounted to only about 5 per cent of total Soviet trade and less than one-quarter of its trade with the non-Communist world. By 1963, Soviet trade with these countries had increased more than fourfold to about \$1.4 billion and had grown to almost 10 per cent of its total trade and to more than one-third of its trade with non-Communist countries. For the less developed world as a whole, however, the U.S.S.R. remains only a modest market and source of supply. In 1963, the Soviet Union accounted for little more than 2 per cent of the aggregate trade turnover of developing countries: the United States share, by comparison, was approximately 20 per cent.

Despite Soviet propaganda claims that it can increase "imports not only of the traditional export items of the developing countries but also of products manufactured by the newly established local industries,"¹⁷ in

**TABLE I: ECONOMIC AID EXTENDED TO SELECTED LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
—JULY, 1954–DECEMBER, 1964 (IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)**

	USSR ^a	US ^b
TOTAL	4,183	13,451
<i>Africa</i>	<i>758</i>	<i>1,105</i>
Algeria	229	149
Congo (Brazzaville)	9	5
Ethiopia	102	122
Ghana	89	163
Guinea	70	47
Kenya	44	22
Mali	55	12
Senegal	7	15
Somali Republic	57	39
Sudan	22	81
Tunisia	28	397
Uganda	16	15
Tanzania	30	38
<i>Asia</i>	<i>2,040</i>	<i>8,524</i>
Afghanistan	541	228
Burma	14	82
Cambodia	21	262
Ceylon	30	87
India	1,011	4,769
Indonesia	369	538
Nepal	10	72
Pakistan	44	2,486
<i>Middle East</i>	<i>1,282</i>	<i>3,231</i>
Iran	39	640
Iraq	184	41
Syrian Arab Republic	150	81
Turkey	10	1,527
United Arab Republic	833	907
Yemen	66	35
<i>Europe: Iceland</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>Latin America: Argentina</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>551</i>

^a U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Current Economic Indicators for the USSR* (Washington, 1965), p. 174.

^b U.S. data is for the period July 1, 1954, to July 1, 1964, and includes economic and technical assistance and defense support obligations under the Foreign Assistance Act and antecedent legislation, authorized Inter-American Development Bank loans, PL 480 funds earmarked for shipments of surplus agricultural products, authorized long-term Export-Import Bank loans, and U.S. contributions to international organizations.

fact, the U.S.S.R. has represented to these countries primarily a market for their agricultural raw materials and foodstuffs. In recent years, textile fibers, primarily cotton, natural rubber and a variety of foodstuffs have accounted for about three-quarters of total Soviet imports from developing countries. The Soviet Union has thus far offered these countries a direct market for less than \$60 million annually in manufactured goods,

about 1 per cent of its total imports of such goods from all countries. By comparison United States imports of manufactured goods amounted to roughly \$1 billion in 1963, more than 17 times the Soviet level, and almost 14 per cent of its total imports of such goods from all sources.

Most noteworthy on the Soviet export side has been the rapid expansion in Soviet deliveries of machinery and equipment, particu-

larly complete plants and installations, and the increasing role played in this export expansion by disbursements under Soviet long-term credits. Ironically enough, the disproportionately high rate of growth of basic industrial output in the U.S.S.R. (which has been accomplished largely at the expense of the agricultural and mineral extractive sectors, and has contributed in no small way to current Soviet economic difficulties) has added to Soviet capabilities for economic penetration of less developed countries. Certain sectors of the Soviet capital goods industries have shown a capacity to produce in excess of current domestic requirements. While such exports find few buyers in the industrial West, they find a ready outlet in the less sophisticated markets of developing countries, particularly if the U.S.S.R. is willing to help finance such exports with long-term credits.¹⁸

Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to developing countries rose from a level of only \$5 million in 1955 to \$360 million in 1963, when such exports accounted for almost half of all Soviet exports to the area and about one-fourth of total Soviet exports of machinery.¹⁹ Careful analysis of the relationship between disbursements under the

Soviet aid program and exports to less developed countries has revealed that for the period 1955–1962 as a whole, about 37 per cent of all Soviet exports to this area (including expenditures for technical assistance) were financed under long-term credits.²⁰ It is no coincidence that although the U.S.S.R. maintains trade relationships with some 40 less developed countries, roughly two-thirds of its total exports to the area (and more than 85 per cent of its exports of complete plants) have been directed to a relatively limited group of countries—India, the U.A.R., Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan—the largest recipients of Soviet aid.

The Soviet Union has made technical assistance a major element of its foreign aid program because it is aware that the shortage of technical skills and trained administrative and managerial personnel provides a formidable obstacle to the effective implementation of its aid undertakings. Nor are the opportunities for political proselytizing provided by such person-to-person contacts overlooked.

During 1964, there were about 10,000 Soviet economic technicians in developing countries engaged in planning or in supervising the construction of Soviet-aided projects.²¹ Some 2,000 trainees from less developed countries were also receiving training in factories and technical institutes in the U.S.S.R. and thousands more were studying in 90 vocational training centers established in less developed countries with Soviet aid and staffed, in part, with Soviet instructors.²² Through Soviet military training programs, in particular, the U.S.S.R. has been afforded an opportunity to influence middle-grade officers in less developed countries where the military exerts a substantial influence on the orientation of existing governments and on the choice of their successors.²³

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

If the new leaders seem reluctant fully to accept the legacy of Khrushchev's more confident theoretical assessments of Communist prospects in developing countries, they apparently remain willing executors of the extensive foreign aid program to which he has

¹⁸ M. Kovner, "Soviet Aid Strategy," *Orbis* (Fall, 1964), p. 631.

¹⁹ The increase in Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to developing countries must also be viewed in perspective. In 1963, such exports represented little more than 4 per cent of the \$8.6 billion worth of machinery and equipment imported into developing areas from all countries. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Current Economic Indicators for the USSR* (June, 1965), p. 157.

²⁰ C. Sawyer, "An Analysis of Foreign Trade between Less Developed Countries and the Communist Area," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1965, p. 61.

²¹ *The New York Times*, July 4, 1965, p. E-3.

²² *Pravda*, June 30, 1965, p. 2.

²³ In addition, there are currently about 10,000 students from developing countries studying in the U.S.S.R. under Soviet academic scholarships. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 23, 1965, p. 1. In recent years, however, Afro-Asian students—perhaps no less than the Soviets themselves—have evidenced some disillusionment with the academic training program. The impact of resulting incidents has prompted a perceptible stiffening of Soviet attitudes toward such students. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XVI (May 13, 1964), p. 25.

committed them. They are also undoubtedly aware that a failure to maintain a high level of new economic and military aid extensions would inevitably lead to a substantial loss of Soviet international prestige. It would also seriously damage what has been one of Moscow's most effective weapons in its struggle to counter Peking's bid for influence in Asia and Africa.

Over the longer term, however, Soviet economic policies in the less developed world would appear to be subject to several severe limitations. Despite the initial advantages of a state monopoly of foreign trade directed by a combination of commercial and political interests, and the pretensions of Soviet propaganda that it can absorb with profit the agricultural and raw materials surpluses of primary producing countries, the U.S.S.R. is likely to find itself considerably less able than the West to satisfy the increasingly insistent demands of the less developed countries. This was already in evidence at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva in 1964 where the U.S.S.R. found itself in the same defensive position as other highly industrialized societies in relation to the developing countries. The Soviet Union rejected as "false" the thesis attributed to "some" of the developing countries which "lumps together the colonial powers and the socialist states as 'rich countries'" and which places "Britain which for 200 years robbed India and is entirely responsible for her poverty . . . on the same level as the U.S.S.R.,"²⁴ and argued that she was not responsible for the grave economic consequences "generated by prolonged colonial domination or by neocolonialism."²⁵ Yet such protestations were a poor substitute for her reluctance or inability to undertake any commitments on such crucial issues for the less developed countries as the liberalization of imports and commodity prices.

Moreover, the new leaders may find themselves under increasing pressure to justify to

their own population as well as to skeptics in Communist parties abroad the efficacy of a foreign lending program whose objectives are unclear and whose achievements, after more than a decade of aid giving, are equivocal. The Russians have not succeeded in definitively aligning new states with the Communist camp (Cuba became a recipient of aid only *after* its political affiliation with the bloc) and they have failed to maintain politically advantageous positions in Syria and Iraq (and now possibly in Algeria) despite substantial aid outlays. It is, furthermore, not clear how long Moscow can retain the loyalty of local Communists against the more revolutionary appeals of the Chinese Communists in countries where the Soviet policy of support for revolutionary democrats effectively exclude the local Communists from power for some time to come.

Finally, the leaders of new states are no unaware of the ultimate incompatibility of their own and Communist aspirations in the less developed world. The tactical parallelism of immediate foreign policy interests on which Soviet cooperation with non-Communist national regimes is presently predicated is likely to become less compelling as old anticolonial slogans rapidly lose their relevance and as these leaders turn their attention away from foreign affairs and seek regional and bilateral relationships based on national self-interest, outside the major disputes and conflicts of both East and West.

But foreign aid for the Soviet Union, no less than for the West, is at best a calculated risk; and its role as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy will undoubtedly be subject to continuing and critical review by the new regime.

Since 1952, **Milton Kovner** has served the United States government in various capacities as a specialist on the U.S.S.R.; in 1961 he was a Research Associate with the Russia Research Center at Harvard University. He is the author of *The Challenge of Coexistence* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press 1961).

²⁴ S. Mikoyan, "Economic Forum in Geneva," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5 (May, 1964), p. 48.

²⁵ *Pravda*, June 14, 1964, p. 5.

BOOK REVIEWS

IN RUSSIA

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN THE U.S.S.R. BY MYRON RUSH. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. 223 pages and index, \$5.95.)

The deposal of Nikita Khrushchev on October 14, 1964, was sudden and complete. It was carried out by the very men that Khrushchev had elevated to positions of authority. Since there is no regularized system of settling the succession problem in the U.S.S.R., the question of the tenure of the new leadership under Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin is an open one.

Myron Rush, a leading authority on Soviet political affairs, offers a valuable analysis of the succession problem in the context of Soviet history. He discusses the crises that arose after the death of Nikolai Lenin and Joseph Stalin. Arguing against the view that an oligarchy can truly govern, he shows that Khrushchev dominated and rotated at will the members of the Secretariat, Presidium, and Central Committee, and suggests that the loyalty of his subordinates depended "on their estimate of his power to bestow benefits and to punish acts of disloyalty."

Despite Khrushchev's great power, the conspiracy against him succeeded for two reasons: first, the absence of terror; second, the attempt by Khrushchev to arrange, "however cautiously," his succession. Further, the author speculates that the man to watch for the future is N. Podgorny. This is a useful and timely study.

A.Z.R.

THE LIFE OF LENIN. BY LOUIS FISCHER. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964. 703 pages, appendix and index, \$10.00.)

"Lenin was the founder of the Soviet state and the father of Soviet politics.

Communist thinking and methods bear the imprint of his vivid, forceful personality. Born April 10, 1870, Lenin died on January 21, 1924, at the age of fifty-three, childless, but leaving many ideological heirs and millions of political offspring throughout the world."

Thus begins Louis Fischer's absorbing biography. It is a monumental study, written with sensitivity, insight, and a sense of history. Approximately a quarter of the book is devoted to Lenin's childhood and early political activities; the major part of this study focuses on Lenin's tenure in power. Louis Fischer's first-hand knowledge of many of the personalities and developments treated in this book adds to the value of this extraordinary work.

A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN. BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965. 256 pages and index, \$5.00.)

At the time of Khrushchev's deposal, Soviet officials criticized the former leader for his "harebrained" and confusion-engendering economic reorganizations. Khrushchev's predilection for tinkering with the economy resulted in many achievements, but it also raised many and new problems which, in part at least, were responsible for his downfall.

This book focuses on the plans, accomplishments, and disappointments of Malenkov and Khrushchev during the 1953-1964 period. It traces the industrial and agricultural changes introduced by Khrushchev and his efforts to place the Soviet economy on a more rational and efficient basis. The interaction of economic and political factors is carefully and informatively presented.

The author notes that "in the mid-1960's the Soviet leadership seems far more

chastened than it had been earlier. Buffeted by economic setbacks and under intense pressure from the Soviet people, who want finally to reap the full benefits of their spectacular economic growth, many Soviet leaders know better than ever before that their future depends upon the degree to which they can satisfy their people's demands."

A.Z.R.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET PLANNING. BY ABRAM BERGSON. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. 394 pages, appendixes and index, \$7.50 in hardback, \$2.95 in paperback.)

Professor Abram Bergson, Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, has written a remarkably lucid study of the Soviet economy, which should be of great value to specialist and non-specialist alike. Though concerned with the principles underlying the allocation of resources in the U.S.S.R., he focuses his analysis on how the economic system actually functions. His presentation is informative, with appropriate stress being placed on the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet economic performance.

A.Z.R.

A VIEW OF ALL THE RUSSIAS. BY LAURENS VAN DER POST. (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1964. 374 pages, \$5.95.)

Laurens van der Post is the finest writer of travel books working in the English language today. To a several month journey through the Soviet Union he has brought his great talent as a writer. The result is a fascinating portrait of the peoples and lands that are the U.S.S.R. With rare perception and sensitivity, and a remarkable gift for getting at several levels of understanding, he gives the reader a true "feel" for the vastness, paradox, power, and backwardness that is Russia. This is the finest introduction that I know to an understanding of Soviet society. A.Z.R.

THE SECOND SOVIET REPUBLIC: THE UKRAINE AFTER WORLD WAR II. BY YAROSLAV BILINSKY. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964. 539 pages, with bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

In view of the tendentious character of so much that has been written about the Ukraine, this volume is extraordinarily useful as a conscientious summary and analysis of certain key developments there since World War II. The author, himself of Ukrainian birth, has been most careful in distinguishing the stages of Soviet policy and the variety of motivations which have shaped Soviet policy in the Ukraine, and the differences between the western Ukraine and the balance of this very considerable territory. His conclusions point toward gradual strengthening of the Ukrainian position as a national and political entity while emphasizing that this can be only a very gradual development at best.

Robert J. Osborn
University of Pennsylvania

SOVIET PARTISANS IN WORLD WAR II. EDITED BY JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964. 792 pages, with appendix, select bibliography, and index, \$12.50.)

This compendious work sheds a bright light on what is clearly more than just one facet of the Soviet Union's struggle against Nazi Germany. Information on the extensive Soviet partisan movement, much of it culled from captured German sources, illuminates a number of facets of Soviet society as a whole, from a period when detailed information about the actual workings of the Soviet system was distressingly scarce. There is also much food for thought for those who are interested in Soviet attitudes toward partisan and guerrilla warfare generally, a topic of considerable import today. The volume is laudable for its well-integrated presentation.

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

North Vietnamese Peace Proposal

On April 13, 1965, a policy declaration by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong outlining a four-point peace program for Vietnam was made public. Following is the text of an English-language summary of this declaration issued by Hsinhua, the Chinese Communist press agency:

Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, elucidated the answering stand of the Government of the D.R.V. on the Vietnam question in his report on Government work at the second session of the United National Assembly. The North Vietnamese News Agency issued the full text of the report today.

Premier Pham Van Dong said that it is the answering policy of the Government of the D. R. V. to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:

1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agree-

ments, the United States Government must withdraw from South Vietnam United States troops, military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all United States military bases there, cancel its "military alliance" with South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the Geneva agreements, the United States Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the D.R.V.

2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones, the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones

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Nonaligned States Appeal on Vietnam

On April 1, 1965, 17 nonaligned nations presented an appeal, originally adopted on March 15 at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to President Lyndon Johnson and other heads-of-state. The appeal urged negotiations on Vietnam by all interested countries to take place as soon as possible. The text of this appeal, as released by Yugoslavia, follows:

Pursuant to the final declaration of the conference of heads of states or governments of nonaligned countries held in Cairo in October, 1964,

We, the undersigned heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts

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MILITARY POLICY

(Continued from page 207)

ently were still pending on whether to deploy a large-scale antiballistic missile system. Some Soviet writers had argued that an appropriate combination of offensive missiles and ABM defenses would be a wise policy for a "peace-loving" country like the U.S.S.R., and would compensate for any imbalance that might exist in strategic delivery systems.²⁷ The heavy resource demands of an ABM system, however, plus technical and political considerations, seem to have prolonged the process of deciding what deployment steps the Soviet Union should take. While the new leaders made occasional reference to recent progress in the ABM field,²⁸ and sanctioned public display of selected items of equipment, they left ambiguous the key question, whether they were prepared to shoulder the very large expenditures that deployment of substantial ABM defenses would entail.

With regard therefore both to offensive missile forces and to defenses against them,

²⁷ Major General N. Talenskii, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," *International Affairs*, No. 10, October, 1964, pp. 15-19.

²⁸ Brezhnev, for example, asserted in July 1965 that "further important headway" had "recently been made" in developing Soviet means of anti-missile defense. (Supplement to *Moscow News*, July 10, 1965.) On the other hand, some Soviet spokesmen continued to concede that the "means of defense lag behind the means of attack," and that it remains "technically impossible" for ABM defenses to destroy all attacking missiles. See G. Gerasimov, "The First Strike Theory," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March, 1965, p. 7.

²⁹ Some idea of the relative strength in missile forces which obtained during the new Soviet regime's first year in office can be gained from figures appearing in the U.S. press, attributed to "official sources" in Washington, which placed Soviet ICBM strength at around 270-300 in mid-1965 compared with around 1300 land and sea-based strategic missiles for the United States. See, for example, "U.S. Outpaces Soviet Missiles," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 6, 1965.

³⁰ See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *Moscow and Arms Control: Evidence from the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June, 1965).

³¹ See: "Russians Dim Hopes for Geneva," *The Washington Post*, July 26, 1965; "U.S. Counters Red Bombs on Viet-Nam as Disarmament Talks Open in Geneva," *ibid.*, July 28, 1965.

the new regime proved no less assiduous than Khrushchev in seeking to enhance the *image* of Soviet strategic power. What remained uncertain was whether Khrushchev's successors would try, where he had failed, to alter the *substance* of the strategic power balance as well. Although Khrushchev evidently undertook to increase the size and pace of Soviet ICBM programs (after the failure in 1962 of his "end run" attempt to change the strategic balance by emplacing medium-range missiles in Cuba), when he bowed out of the picture in 1964 the Soviet Union still found itself in a second-best strategic position.²⁹

The new leaders were left, therefore, with fundamental problems of decision concerning the strategic power relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. They could either reconcile themselves to living with the situation as they found it, or they could try to change it by one means or another—through further costly buildup of strategic forces, through a strenuous research and development effort to achieve technological breakthroughs, through more realistic pursuit of arms control agreements, or some combination of these avenues.

As far as use of arms control negotiation for trying to alter the strategic balance was concerned, Khrushchev's successors appeared somewhat less sanguine than he that a significant dent in the United States strategic posture might be achieved through this avenue. Much of the Soviet interest in arms control under the new regime tended to focus on the prospect, on which Khrushchev also had his eye,³⁰ of utilizing arms control maneuver and propaganda to impede nuclear progress by Communist China and West Germany. Although China's achievement of nuclear status was not checked, the Soviet leader evidently held on to the hope that the leverage of a prospective nonproliferation agreement could be used to forestall creation of an Atlantic nuclear force (MLF or other arrangements) in which Germany would gain closer access to nuclear weapons. This was made clear by the Soviet position taken at the resumption of the Geneva disarmament talks in late July, 1965.³¹

"NATIONAL-LIBERATION" WARS

Search for a suitable Soviet policy position toward local wars and the variant known in the Communist lexicon as "national-liberation" wars was also under way before the new regime came to power. On the doctrinal level, this led to some backing away from the once-rigid Soviet declaratory line that local wars involving the major powers would "inevitably" escalate into general nuclear war and hence must be avoided. In Soviet military literature, it also was conceded that "insufficient attention" had previously been given to the problems of small wars.³² To some extent, this doctrinal shift softened the contradiction between the Soviet stand that local wars breed general war and are therefore unsafe, and the consistent Soviet pledge of firm support for local conflicts of the "national-liberation" variety. At the same time, however, Soviet policy under Khrushchev stopped short of such concrete steps as committing Soviet forces in local military conflict situations. Though Khrushchev talked a strong line of support for national-liberation conflicts, when test cases arose he proved to be essentially a straddler—neither ceasing to promise Soviet support nor actually tendering it in forms which might risk the unpredictable danger of widening war.

Upon taking the reins of Soviet leadership, Khrushchev's successors also found themselves challenged by the Chinese wing of the Communist camp to demonstrate that the Soviet Union was not defaulting on its obligations to local revolutionary movements. In effect, they had the choice of following Khrushchev's example as a straddler or of yielding to the Chinese argument that the United States can be safely opposed and ultimately defeated by waging the revolutionary struggle more militantly at the level of small wars and insurgency actions. Developments in Southeast Asia since the beginning of this year have made Vietnam the new regime's chief test case in the arena of national-liberation conflicts.

³² For a fuller discussion of these trends, see the present author's *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-129.

When the Kosygin visit to Hanoi with a military aid delegation was made known in February, 1965, it seemed to betoken a major foreign policy decision by the new regime to abandon Khrushchev's *de facto* policy of disengagement from the Vietnamese problem—a position implicit in his cautious response to the Tonkin Gulf crisis of August, 1964, and in his apparent willingness to let the situation ripen further before committing Soviet prestige too deeply. Why Kosygin went to Hanoi is open to speculation. Perhaps the new Soviet regime calculated that the United States was on the verge of pulling out of Vietnam, and hence that Soviet entry upon the scene could be accomplished without great risk of a United States-Soviet confrontation or severe disturbance of their relations in other areas. Perhaps also the Kosygin mission was intended to reestablish Soviet influence in Hanoi in order to counter Chinese influence and to exert moderating leverage upon the Hanoi regime, lest it be inclined to provoke the United States into an unnecessarily dangerous response.

In any event, however, a new situation was created following the Vietcong attack on Pleiku while Kosygin was in Hanoi and the subsequent United States bombing raids and buildup of forces. The response of the Soviet leadership was at first guarded, as though to preserve prospects of mediating the crisis, but gradually the Soviet Union moved toward a harder and more uncompromising position. As Soviet commitments to North Vietnam deepened with such developments in the spring of 1965 as the sending of Soviet air defense missiles to the Hanoi area and hints that "volunteers" might be furnished if requested, it appeared that the Soviet Union was moving further along the road toward military involvement in Vietnam.

By the end of July, Soviet-built missile sites had begun to shoot down United States aircraft and were in turn subjected to retaliatory attacks. Although this seemed to represent one more step toward a United States-Soviet military entanglement, both sides initially skirted open acknowledgement that Soviet military personnel may have been involved,

suggesting mutual interest in postponing exacerbation of this inflammatory issue as long as possible.

Meanwhile, efforts of various parties through diplomatic and other channels to find some formula for bringing the Vietnam crisis to mediation had not yet borne fruit. The Soviet leadership, despite its professed and presumably genuine interest in avoiding escalation of the war, seemed either reluctant or unable to persuade Hanoi to shift the Vietnam struggle from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Perhaps this attitude rested on Russian unwillingness to foreclose the possibility of decisive Vietcong military and political success in the south before increased United States power could be effectively brought to bear.

Throughout the period in which intensification of the Vietnam crisis was gradually narrowing the Soviet leadership's freedom of maneuver and nudging it toward deeper military commitments in Southeast Asia, there was, curiously enough, no marked upsurge of professional attention in Soviet literature to the problems of conducting local wars. Some writing on the subject reiterated standard Soviet criticism of Western theories of limited war and suggested that the Soviet armed forces should not exclude the possibility of having to wage such wars, but no elaboration of a Soviet doctrine of limited war emerged. The dominant note, as the Vietnamese crisis grew, was to revive the thesis that local conflicts could bring the "interests of opposing powers" into collision and increase the danger of world war.³³ Both military and political spokesmen joined in raising the spectre of world war, rather than emphasizing Soviet capabilities to exert local military pressure. Coupled with invocation of the dangers of escalation to global war were warnings of the destruction Soviet strategic power could visit upon the United States. On the whole, this was a line little different than Khrushchev's characteristic response to local crisis situations.

Although this tendency to fall back on

precedents of the Khrushchev period suggested certain constants in Soviet weighing of the risks involved in lending local military support to national-liberation conflicts, it did not necessarily mean there was no room for change under the new regime in the Soviet stance toward these conflicts in general or toward the Vietnam situation in particular. From a military standpoint, as its actions up to the late summer of 1965 suggested, the Soviet Union could go some steps further in furnishing weapons, training, technical advice and even "volunteers" without open and formal commitment of its own forces. Tolerant of a fairly high level of such activity might obtain, providing both sides remained willing to accept the fiction of no direct Soviet intervention.

If, beyond this, the Soviet leaders were to entertain a policy of direct local intervention by Soviet forces on a serious scale either in Vietnam or elsewhere remote from the continental base of Soviet power, then they doubtless would have unfinished military preparations on their hands. Although measures fostered in Khrushchev's day in such fields as amphibious and airlift operation had somewhat improved the general level of capabilities for projection of Soviet military power to distant areas, the new regime still would face a major investment of resource to meet relevant troop lift, logistics, basing and other requirements. The buildup of such capabilities would be a fairly long-term matter, of course, so that even were the new regime to make the painful investment decisions involved, little immediate effect could be expected.

Whatever limits might be imposed on more active Soviet military intervention in Vietnam by such factors as geography and logistics the most telling constraints were doubtless of another character. The essential choice facing the Soviet leaders was whether to commit themselves ever more deeply to a dangerous effort to dislodge the United States from Southeast Asia or to seek some way to mediate the situation and avoid the prospect of being

³³ Bochkarev, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

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U.S.S.R. POLICY IN ASIA

(Continued from page 220)

been a serious alternative open to Khrushchev's successors because of the storm it would unleash within the Communist camp. The natural course, accordingly, the one they followed, was to continue the Khrushchev policies. Vietnam has been the only exception to this rule.

Russia would perhaps have been engaged in Vietnam under any leadership. Responsibility for Moscow's predicament there, however, lies with Khrushchev's successors. In the brief hindsight of a year Khrushchev's aloofness in Southeast Asia emerges as the sanest policy for the Soviet Union. The Russians' dilemma—and it should not be minimized because the Americans' is larger—is that to the extent they become contestants in Vietnam they lose their freedom to act as mediators. And the irony of this is that only a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, along the lines of the Geneva settlement of 1954, can serve Moscow's purposes in the end.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

(Continued from page 226)

a certain extent this is inevitable in solving complicated problems." But many errors resulted from the "bureaucratic approach," the subservient attitude of the leaders, and the unwillingness of some officials, even the higher ones, to admit their mistakes.

The national plan, as envisaged by Kosygin, was to be the result of cooperation between the central authority and local bodies, in close association with the Academy of Sciences and technical experts. The success of a plan depends, in the first place, on its being provided with a firm scientific basis—but how this was to be achieved Kosygin did not elucidate. He pleaded for a "proper balance" between the various parts of the plan and deplored

the relative neglect of agriculture. Inevitably, he was again vague as to how the "balance" was to be established.

The urge to provide the plan with a scientific basis has led some of the Soviet economists to explore the possibilities of mathematical economics. There has been discussion of (and some experimentation with) the so-called "system of network planning" which involves the use of computers. A computer center was created in Moscow in 1963 and the application of the mathematical method to planning has its advocates.² There is, however, little agreement among the mathematical economists themselves and it is unlikely that their forbidding doctrine will be of practical use to Soviet planners for a long time, if at all.

The above observations may justify the conclusion that, contrary to the official Soviet view, the elimination of Khrushchev accomplished little in solving the mountainous economic and administrative problems facing the Kremlin. "The Communist Party, which . . . possesses knowledge of the laws of social development," says the 1961 party program, "ensures correct leadership in all the work of communist construction, giving it an organized, planned, and scientific character." This precious knowledge and gift of foresight did not prevent three decades of Stalin's "cult of personality" and eleven years of Khrushchev's "subjectivism."

There is another puzzling question. The present Soviet leaders were close collaborators of Stalin and Khrushchev. How is one to explain their acceptance, for years, of the "cult of personality" and "subjectivism" which they now denounce? An answer to this question would explain much of the inner workings of the Soviet government.

The root of Soviet trouble lies deeper than in mere personalities. Marxist-Leninist dogmatism prevents the Communist leaders from admitting that collectivization is the cause of the plight of agriculture and that public ownership of all means of production and the mammoth growth of industry have created a situation that the party and the government are unable to control. Russian exploration in outer space has demonstrated

² For a brief, nontechnical statement of the status of mathematical economics in the U.S.S.R. and the conflicting views of Soviet authorities, see *The Economist*, London, July 3, 1965, p. 43.

Soviet capacity for high technical achievement. However, the centralized control of the economy of a huge country presents problems of an entirely different order. Science, so confidently invoked by both Khrushchev and Kosygin, seems to offer no sure solutions.

CULTS, COUPS & LEADERSHIPS

(Continued from page 200)

demoted to lesser posts. On the other hand, V. V. Matskevich, who had been dismissed under fire by Khrushchev as minister of agriculture in 1960, was reappointed to that position in February, 1965. Others, too, who fell from favor under Khrushchev have been restored to high position. Aleksei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law and political confidant, was removed as editor of *Izvestia* and member of the Central Committee for "committing mistakes in his work." Similarly, Pavel Satyukov, editor of *Pravda*, and M. A. Kharlamov, chairman of the committee for broadcasting and television, also lost their positions. In the spring of 1965, L. F. Ilyichev was released as Central Committee secretary and head of the party's ideological commission in favor of P. N. Demichev. Central Committee secretary V. N. Titov, who had borne important responsibilities for party personnel appointments, was transferred to Kazakhstan as second secretary as part of a major reshuffling of cadres in that important and trouble-ridden republic.

The average age of the 12 full Presidium members is 59. Unlike the aging Chinese Communist leadership, the Presidium embraces several chronological and political generations. Of these men, Shvernik, 77, and Mikoyan, 70, are the last representatives of the pre-revolutionary Old Bolsheviks. Their influence is manifestly waning; but their vast experience, especially Mikoyan's, and their connection with the generation of the Revolution, is of use to the rest of the Presidium. Suslov joined the party in 1921. There is no representative of the political generation of the N.E.P. period in the 1920's. The largest group in the Presidium—Brezhnev,

Kosygin, Voronov, Kirilenko, Podgorny, and Shelest—were born between 1903 and 1910. They lived through the Revolution and Civil War as youngsters but did not become politically active until Stalin had already fastened his grip on the party. They joined the C.P.S.U. between 1927 and 1931; and thus participated as party members in the industrialization and collectivization drives of the 1930's and experienced the great purge at lower political levels. Of this group, only Brezhnev and Kosygin held leadership posts at the center during Stalin's last years: Brezhnev briefly as a Central Committee secretary and Kosygin as a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers concerned with light industry. The political generation of the 1930's is also missing in the Presidium. The youngest leaders—Mazurov, 51, Polyansky 48, and Shelepin, 47—joined the party at the conclusion of the purges in 1939 and 1940.

Except for Kosygin, all can point to considerable service in the party *apparatus* at various times in their careers in several different capacities—especially line assignment as district, regional and city party secretaries. Most of these men derived originally from lower-class backgrounds and hence their success is closely bound to the party and the Soviet system in general which nurtured their advance. Unlike most of their predecessors, the great bulk of the younger members received technical or engineering training in young manhood. Few practiced their profession for more than several years, if at all, before entering political-administrative work; but their more advanced technical educations have perhaps helped them better understand the problems of a rapidly industrializing society. The major exception is Shelepin, who graduated from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature.

Speculation about possible future leadership cleavages or the emergence of a particular leader to a preeminent position can hardly be useful at this time given the paucity of evidence. However, the stability of the Presidium in the eight months following Khrushchev's ouster does not necessarily

test to an absence of conflict and maneuvering within that body. After all, between Stalin's death in March, 1953, and June, 1957, only one Presidium member, Beria, was dropped, despite the existence of deep and bitter intrigue. Yet by November, 1964, the original ten members of the post-Stalin Presidium only Mikoyan remained; all the rest were discharged in disgrace.

From afar the strongest men in the Presidium appear to be Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov, and Shelepin. Brezhnev and Kosygin appear at present to be firmly enmeshed by virtue of their positions. Kosygin

has spent his life in industrial administration and economic planning. His support derives from the Council of Ministers, for he has had no opportunity to build up a following in the party cadre. Brezhnev has had most experience in regional and central party organizations; and, as second-in-command under Khrushchev after mid-1963, he had considerable opportunity to build a personal political following. He may also have close relations with the military, stemming from the period when he had special party responsibilities for the armed forces. Brezhnev's power, however, may be partially countered by Podgorny, a prominent party secretary who has deep roots in the important Ukrainian party organization, also one of Brezhnev's sources of support. Podgorny gave the main report on the reorganization of the party structure at the November Central Committee plenum. During the spring and summer of 1965, however, Podgorny's public role appeared to wane. Suslov has served longer on the Presidium than any other member except Mikoyan, having been appointed to that body in 1955. Like Brezhnev, he had been a Central Committee secretary during Stalin's last months. At 63 he is reported to be in ill health; nevertheless, he still plays a major leadership role as indicated by the fact that he delivered the Presidium report against Khrushchev at the October meeting of the Central Committee. His major concerns

have been ideology and Soviet relations with foreign communist parties.

Aleksandr Shelepin, the youngest Presidium member, boasts of one of the most meteoric careers in the current leadership. An able professional administrator whose performance gives evidence also of adeptness in bureaucratic politics, Shelepin, since 1952, has successively held the posts of first secretary of the Komsomol, head of the K.G.B.¹⁰, Central Committee secretary with cadre responsibilities and (since November, 1962) head of the top-level watchdog and inspection agency, the Party-State Control Committee. His appointment as full Presidium member on the heels of Khrushchev's fall indicates that he benefited greatly from the misfortune of his old benefactor. As head of the Party-State Control Committee, he is the only Presidium member who bridges both the party and governmental hierarchies.

CONCLUSION

In the past, such periods of oligarchical rule have been characterized by intense factional struggle which have eventually given way to the emergence of a single dominant individual. The history of Soviet politics, the absence of widely accepted standards for the change of leadership and the high concentration of power in the hands of a few men, would suggest the unlikelihood of a lengthy perpetuation of oligarchic government. On the other hand, unlike the post-Stalin Presidium, the present body appears to be dominated by organization men whose attitudes have been shaped by years of experience in previously established bureaucratic institutions and who may be better able than their predecessors to rule collectively.

Indeed, Khrushchev's forced retirement at the hands of the Presidium collective may symbolize the changing nature of Soviet society and the impact of these changes on the political system. Khrushchev might well be regarded as a transitional figure, not only because he presided over the liberalization of some of the harsher features of the Stalinist regime—while retaining what he believed the essential Leninist heritage—but also because

¹⁰ The K.G.B. is the secret police agency in the Soviet Union.

he stood as a bridge between the personalistic dictatorship of Stalin and the more oligarchic rule of the present. Khrushchev, personally, had a substantial impact on Soviet society; but he does not rank along with Lenin and Stalin as great social architects. Nor, as we now know, was Khrushchev able to rule without regard to the opinions of his colleagues or powerful bureaucratic interests. In short, circumstances which in the past worked to elevate a single dictator may now be changing.

Whether or not oligarchic rule continues for some time, the leadership and the party will have to reckon with the altered social environment. Soviet society may have reached a stage of development where ruthless goading and whipping from above by an iron-willed dictator would be counterproductive to the leadership's own goals. The basic transformations in Soviet society, in which the party played a major mobilizing rule, were accomplished some years ago. The new, postrevolutionary institutions have crystalized and have established identities of their own. Although it would be misleading to speak of pressure group politics in an American sense, loosely defined interest groups identified with institutions, professions and functions have gradually made their appearance and the leadership has begun to take their advice into account. To ignore the voices of the scientific community, industrial managers, state bureaucracy, cultural intelligentsia, and even industrial workers and peasants would be to run grave risks in policy-making.

Although the Soviet regime still visualizes its leadership role in society in far more activist terms than its counterparts in the United States and Western Europe, the secular trend represents a gradual shift from direct mobilization toward such functions as coordination, reconciliation and balancing of competing demands and interests in various segments of the total party-state bureaucracy. A period of oligarchical rule may well increase these facets of governance because the character of the leadership provides greater access for such plural interests into the policy-making

process. Finally, as the society has become more differentiated and complex, and skills have been more broadly diffused, the highly centralized command system has become less functional.

The Soviet population is also better educated and, therefore, not so susceptible to the old forms of mobilization through terror, direct administrative rule and crude agitation and propaganda. During the last decade, the party has attempted a number of new, more subtle and indirect techniques governing the people; moreover, in several areas it has loosened the bonds of ideological orthodoxy. In addition, the regime has discovered that it cannot afford to disregard the authority of scientific and technical knowledge if it wishes to spur further economic development.

To say that the party is seeking to adapt its nature and functions to the changing milieu does not necessarily imply that it will lose its monopoly of political power or that its ideological nature will give way to pragmatism. The population still has little, if any, say in the selection of political leaders and overt, organized opposition within the party—to say nothing of opposition parties—is still anathematized. The party is not likely to “wither away,” given its authority derived from the revolution and its powerful control over the society. Nonetheless, unless the party is willing to run the risk of permitting itself to become isolated from the dynamic elements in society and thereby perhaps retarding Soviet socio-economic modernization, it must adapt to the new demands.

Several events in the not too distant future may provide clues about the extent of the ferment and adaptation. A new constitution has been in the planning stages since 1960; and under a new chairman, Brezhnev, the drafting commission may produce a draft before too long. Secondly, a party Congress should be held by the end of this year according to party statutes; but indications are that it will be postponed until 1966. The Twenty-Third Party Congress may well provide the first litmus test of the nature and orientation of the post-Khrushchev regime.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 236)

tion and is one of the few works of multiple authorship which rises above the level of a mere collection of research papers.

R.J.O.

THE THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE: Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas. EDITED BY THOMAS PERRY THORNTON. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1964. 355 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$7.50.)

During the post-Stalinist era the Soviet perspective of the "third world" has undergone considerable change. Since Stalin had rigidly adhered to the notion of Communist and non-Communist camps (except in the early stage of the Comintern and in the 1930's), even the idea of a "third world" had to be created by Khrushchev. In the mid-1950's the Soviet leaders came to terms with the various national bourgeoisies on both the theoretical and the practical political level and, recognizing their fundamental opposition to imperialism, began to accept them as allies of Communism. This change in official policy has been accompanied by modifications in "scholarly" writings by Soviet theoreticians. In this volume, selections from fourteen essays trace the evolution of this trend. In addition to an introductory chapter, the editor provides comments on each essay elucidating the significance of the work.

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IN FINLAND

HISTORY OF FINLAND. By JOHN H. WUORINEN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. 548 pages, appendix and index, \$10.00.)

John H. Wuorinen, Professor of History at Columbia University, has written a

much-needed, definitive history of Finland. "This book describes some of the main aspects of Finland's position and history during the many centuries before the nineteenth when the country was an integral part of the Swedish realm; offers a summary of the eleven decades from 1808-09 to 1917 when Finland was an autonomous constitutional state in union with Russia; discusses the attainment of independence in 1917-18, the growth of the republic in 1919-39, its involvement in World War II, and the consequences of the war; and delineates, in broad outline, the development of the nation since 1945."

Lucidly written and well-organized, the book is a distinguished work of scholarship. It traces the evolution of Finnish socio-economic development and democracy and discusses contemporary Finland's foreign policy with restraint and understanding. Ever-sensitive to the moods and wishes of its neighboring Communist colossus, Finland has nonetheless managed to retain its cultural and political independence and democratic character. Its success in this effort must surely have some relevance for the leaders of many of the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia.

A.Z.R.

MILITARY POLICY

(Continued from page 240)

drawn into a grave military confrontation with the United States. In turn, this choice might be said to hinge broadly on the question of whether Soviet obligations to the national liberation movement and to Hanoi's cause should for the first time be given priority over the Soviet Union's larger interests, such as dealing effectively with its accumulated internal problems, improving its competitive position vis-à-vis the advanced countries of the West, and above all, avoiding the risk of a major war which could ultimately endanger the Soviet Union itself.

NORTH VIETNAM PROPOSAL

(Continued from page 237)

must refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries. There must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel in their respective territory.

3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the N.F.L.S.V. [the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, or political arm of the Vietcong] without any foreign interference.

4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.

Pham Van Dong said that the aforementioned stand of the D.R.V. Government unquestionably enjoys the approval and support of all peace and justice-loving governments and peoples in the world. The Government of the D.R.V. is of the view that the stand expounded above is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the Vietnam problem.

If this basis is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, and it will be possible to consider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam.

The Government of the D.R.V. declares that any approach contrary to the above-mentioned stand is inappropriate. Any approach tending to secure a United Nations intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate because such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam.

NONALIGNED STATES APPEAL

(Continued from page 237)

in Southeast Asia and in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in

the United Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace;

We solemnly reaffirm the right of people to self-determination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force;

We reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of state.

We express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence, and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic consequences;

We are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam;

We are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeking a peaceful solution through negotiations. We, therefore, make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start such negotiations, as soon as possible, without posing any precondition, so that a political solution to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva agreements on Vietnam and of the declaration of the conference of nonaligned countries held in Cairo.

We invite the governments of all countries interested in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal.

[Editor's note:—this appeal was signed by representatives of the governments of Afghanistan, Algeria, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zambia]

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Aug. 3—At the 17-nation Geneva disarmament talks, the head of the Soviet delegation, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, tells the conferees that “no progress” can be made at Geneva until the U.S. withdraws its overseas troops and dismantles its bases in foreign countries. He also reiterates Soviet opposition to a mixed manned nuclear fleet (M.L.F.) within the NATO alliance.

Aug. 17—At Geneva, the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, William C. Foster, presents a draft treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Aug. 31—Tsarapkin formally rejects the U.S. nonproliferation draft treaty.

East Africa

Aug. 20—President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania, Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda, and Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, meeting in Nairobi, issue a communiqué after a day and a half of talks affirming their desire to strengthen “the common services and the common market.” It is reported that the Central Legislative Assembly (a governing body that supervises transportation, customs, communications and other services shared by the 3 countries) has urged the 3 leaders to overcome their differences.

Monetary Reform

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 8—The International Monetary Fund, in its monthly publication, *International Financial Statistics*, discloses that international monetary liquidity (the total of all nations’ reserves of gold, holdings of dollars,

pounds and francs and automatic drawing rights in the I.M.F.) showed a small decline in the first 6 months of 1965.

Aug. 10—The Group of Ten (the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Japan, and Sweden [Switzerland is an observer]) publishes a study, known as the Ossola Report, analyzing various proposals for improving international liquidity.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

(See Dominican Republic)

United Nations, The

(See also *Cyprus*)

Aug. 16—The U.S. Representative to the U.N., Arthur J. Goldberg, tells the 33-nation committee on peacekeeping assessments that the U.S. will not insist on the enforcement of Article 19 of the U.N. Charter which provides that nations over 2 years in arrears on assessments lose their votes in the General Assembly. Goldberg declares that the U.S. recognizes that “the General Assembly is not prepared to apply Article 19 in the present situation and that the consensus of the membership is that the Assembly should proceed normally.” The Soviet Union, France and 11 other nations have refused to pay for certain peacekeeping operations of the U.N. Goldberg asserts that the U.S. will reserve the right to refuse to pay for U.N. activities that it may find objectionable.

Aug. 24—U Thant announces that he has ordered Major General Robert H. Nimmo, head of the U.N. observer team in Kashmir, to return to the U.N. for consultations.

Aug. 27—*The New York Times* reports that

U Thant has approached the 14 nations that have participated in international conferences on Indochina in an attempt to seek a peaceful Vietnamese settlement.

Aug. 31—The U.S. deposits formal ratification of 2 amendments to the U.N. Charter at the U.N.; U.N. approval of the 2 amendments is now completed. The amendments increase Security Council membership from 11 to 15 and the Economic and Social Council, from 18 to 27, to give more representation to the Asian and African nations.

AUSTRALIA

Aug. 13—Negotiators for Australia and New Zealand reach agreement on substantially reducing trade tariffs between the 2 countries.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

(See individual countries listed in alphabetical order)

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Aug. 7—*Hsinhua* (official press agency) reports a government statement declaring that Chinese troops will be sent into Vietnam if necessary "to drive out the United States aggressors."

Aug. 24—*The New York Times* reports that yesterday Communist China announced it would give Tibet the status of a self-governing autonomous region.

CYPRUS

Aug. 5—During U.N. Security Council debate on Turkey's charges that the Greek Cypriote government has violated the rights of the Turkish Cypriote minority, the British delegate accuses the Greek Cypriote government of blocking a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus situation. On July 23, the Greek Cypriote members of the House of Representatives approved a new electoral law placing Greeks and Turks on a common roll; they also voted to extend their terms of office and that of President Makarios by 12 months.

Aug. 10—The Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution urging all parties to the Cyprus dispute to refrain from aggravating the situation.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Aug. 9—The mediation committee of the Organization of American States presents the Act of Reconciliation to both factions in the Dominican crisis, the military-civilian junta led by Brigadier General Antonio Imbert Barreras and rebel forces led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño Deñó. The Reconciliation Act provides that both factions recognize a provisional government led by Héctor García-Godoy. In addition the committee presents both factions with the final draft of the Institutional Act setting up an interim constitution.

Aug. 18—General Imbert tells the O.A.S. mission that a revised reconciliation plan is not satisfactory. The plan had been revised to make it acceptable to Colonel Caamaño.

Aug. 29—U.S. President Lyndon Johnson at a news conference, declares that "any who continue to oppose the O.A.S. solution are not friends of peace."

Aug. 30—General Imbert and his military civilian junta resign to allow a provisional government to be established.

Aug. 31—The O.A.S. mediators and the rebel forces under Colonel Caamaño sign a formal pact establishing a provisional government under President-designate Héctor García-Godoy. Commander Francisco Caminero Rivera signs the Reconciliation Act on behalf of the junta.

FRANCE

Aug. 4—It is reported that the French Minister of State for Culture, André Malraux, in a 3-hour meeting in China yesterday with Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, delivered a letter from French President Charles de Gaulle.

Aug. 18—Following a cabinet meeting at which Malraux reported to President de Gaulle and his ministers on his talk with Mao, Information Minister Alain Peyre

fitte issues a statement declaring that the meeting was of "very great significance."

Aug. 31—U.S. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball confers with French President Charles de Gaulle in Paris on Vietnam and the NATO Alliance.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

Aug. 11—Dr. Rolf Pauls, the first West German ambassador to Israel, arrives to assume his duties.

Aug. 16—Asher Ben-Nathan, the first Israeli ambassador to West Germany, arrives in Bonn.

Aug. 19—A West German court pronounces 17 staff members of the Auschwitz concentration camp guilty of murder and torture.

GHANA

Aug. 3—Kwesi Armah, who headed the recent Ghanaian mission to North Vietnam, is en route to Ghana with a letter for President Kwame Nkrumah from North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh. Armah is the new minister of foreign trade for Ghana, and formerly Ghana's ambassador to Britain. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

GREAT BRITAIN

Aug. 3—The Treasury reports that Britain's gold and foreign currency reserves dropped in July by £50 million (\$140 million). It is reported that all remaining British reserves are borrowed funds.

Aug. 4—Minister of Defense Denis Healey announces that £220 million (\$616 million) have been cut from the annual defense bill to help improve the economy.

Aug. 10—The Government reports that in July exports rose to a record £417 million (\$1.1 billion) from £376 million (\$1.05 billion) in June, on a seasonally adjusted basis.

Aug. 22—A Labor member of Parliament dies of a heart attack; Prime Minister Harold Wilson's parliamentary majority is reduced to 2 seats.

GREECE

Aug. 2—Premier George Athanasiadis-Novas

asks the parliament for a vote of confidence on his government.

Aug. 5—By a vote of 167 to 131, Premier Athanasiadis-Novas' government is toppled by the parliament.

King Constantine confers with ex-premier George Papandreou, who resigned on July 15 when the King opposed a purge of right-wing army elements. Papandreou later declares that he offered the King 2 alternatives: either to reappoint him as premier or to call new elections.

Aug. 18—Elias Tsirimokos, a Socialist, is asked to form a new government by King Constantine.

Aug. 20—Tsirimokos' new cabinet is sworn in.

Aug. 29—By a vote of 159-135, the government of Elias Tsirimokos is defeated in the parliament.

INDIA

Aug. 6—The Indian government announces that food rationing in cities will provide men, women and children with 12 ounces of wheat or rice a day. The national average consumption is 14.4 ounces daily. The move is taken to alleviate a food shortage.

Aug. 8—After the Emergency Committee of the cabinet meets at Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's home, it is announced that Indian reinforcements will be sent to Kashmir. It is charged that infiltrators from Pakistani-held areas of Kashmir have fought with Indian troops.

Aug. 18—It is disclosed that Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh sent a note last night to Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan cancelling talks scheduled for August 20 on the Rann of Cutch dispute because of the "deterioration" in relations.

Aug. 19—Police fire on mobs looting grain stores in the small city of Kolhapur; at least 4 persons are killed and 15 are injured, following a demonstration protesting food shortages.

Aug. 25—Defense Minister Y. B. Chavan tells the parliament that Indian troops crossed

the ceasefire line in Kashmir last night and seized control of 2 Pakistani posts.

Aug. 29—An Indian spokesman announces that a Pakistani attack along the Kashmiri ceasefire line has been repulsed and that Indian troops have held the Pir Sahiba post (on the Pakistani side of the line) against a Pakistani counterattack.

INDONESIA

Aug. 9—The State Minister attached to the Minister of Oil Affairs, Major General Ibnu Sutowo, declares that the government will seize oil refinery installations belonging to the Stanvac and Shell Oil Companies in Sungai Gerong and Plaju, in South Sumatra, and Balikpapan, in east Borneo, by the end of 1965.

Aug. 17—Indonesia withdraws its membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (a specialized U.N. agency).

At a celebration marking 20 years of independence, President Sukarno condemns "the U.S. aggression against Vietnam. . . ."

Aug. 22—*The New York Times* reports that yesterday and today 2 Indonesian transport planes delivered military supplies to the Laotian neutralist forces under General Kong Le. An Indonesian embassy official in Laos asserts that no arms were included in the shipment, "only uniforms and equipment. . . ." The planes returned to Indonesia with neutralist Laotian officers, who are to receive military training.

JAPAN

Aug. 6—In Hiroshima, ceremonies mark the 20th anniversary of the first atomic explosion.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF

Aug. 13—The National Assembly votes its approval of sending a 15,000-man combat division to South Vietnam.

Aug. 14—In the absence of 62 members of the opposition, the National Assembly votes 110-0 (with 1 abstention) to ratify the South Korean-Japanese amity treaty. The

opposition has resigned from the Assembly in protest against the treaty.

Aug. 25—Some 10,000 university and high school students demonstrate in Seoul for the third consecutive day to protest the treaty with Japan.

LAOS

Aug. 13—*The New York Times* reports that a U.S. adviser has confirmed that U.S. military personnel are advising Laotian guerrillas attacking North Vietnamese troops along the Ho Chi Minh trail, a supply route running through Laos and North and South Vietnam.

MADAGASCAR

Aug. 24—The cabinet resigns; earlier this month general elections were held in which the ruling Democratic party won a majority.

MALAYSIA, FEDERATION OF

Aug. 9—According to the official Singapore radio, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman and Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew, in a joint statement, have announced the withdrawal of Singapore from the Federation (now composed of Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah). Under the Independence of Singapore Agreement, Malaysia and Singapore will continue to cooperate on defense and commerce.

Prince Abdul Rahman tells the Malaysian House of Representatives that his government decided that Singapore must be "separated" from the Federation because of poor relations between Malaysia and Singapore and the threat of racial clashes. Singapore, controlled by a Chinese ethnic majority, had been the scene of Malay-Chinese racial conflict. Both houses of the legislature vote to eject Singapore from the Federation and to treat it as an independent state.

At a press conference, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announces that Singapore will continue to cooperate with Great Britain in defense matters, but will ask

seek stronger ties with Communist countries and Indonesia.

Aug. 19—A council of hereditary rulers of the 9 Malayan states elects Prince Ismail Nasiruddin Shah, Sultan of the Malayan State of Trengganu, as Paramount Ruler of Malaysia, as provided in the Malaysian constitution.

Aug. 21—Prince Abdul Rahman, on a visit to Sabah, warns politicians there against seceding from the Federation.

The Minister for Sabah Affairs in the Malaysian cabinet, Donald Stephens, resigns; his party has called for reviewing Sabah's membership in the Federation following Singapore's eviction.

PAKISTAN

(See *India*)

RUMANIA

Aug. 21—The Grand National Assembly (parliament) approves the draft of a new constitution. The Assembly reelects Chairman of the State Council (President) Chivu Stoica and President of the Council of Ministers (Premier) Ion Gheorghe Maurer.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Yemen*)

SINGAPORE

(See also *Malaysia*)

Aug. 26—The Singapore government announces that it has unveiled a plot by Indonesia to overthrow the Singapore government; 20 members of the People's Revolutionary (Communist-dominated) party are arrested for collaborating with Indonesia.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Aug. 24—Harold Strachan, a former political prisoner who gave information on prison brutality to *The Rand Daily Mail*, is arrested. The *Mail* has published articles unmasking prison brutality.

SPAIN

Aug. 13—The cabinet and Generalissimo Francisco Franco approve a bill to end direct censorship of the press.

SUDAN, THE

Aug. 5—It is reported that the 2-week amnesty period offered by the government to southern rebels expired last night. Some 5 persons took advantage of it. The southern Africans wish to secede from the Arab-dominated northern provinces.

At the end of a trip to Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania to persuade the 3 governments to refrain from interfering in The Sudan's internal strife, Premier Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub declares that it has been agreed that "no one country can allow political refugees to engage in politics."

SYRIA

Aug. 23—The Arab Socialist Baath party establishes a National Council (legislature). The 95-man Council will replace the 5-member Presidency Council which has ruled since 1963.

TURKEY

Aug. 9—Turkish Premier Suat Hayri Urguplu arrives in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

U.S.S.R., THE

Aug. 1—*The New York Times* reports that it has been learned that Vladimir I. Stepakov, a former editor of *Izvestia*, has been chosen as head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee (in effect the ideological head of the Communist party organization).

Aug. 6—At a Kremlin reception for visiting King Mohammad Zahir of Afghanistan, Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin accuses the U.S. of aggression in Vietnam. U.S. Ambassador Foy D. Kohler leaves the reception.

Aug. 11—The Canadian Wheat Board, a government sales agency, announces the sale of 187 million bushels of Canadian wheat and flour to the Soviet Union; together with the Soviet purchase of 27 million bushels last week, a total of 214 million bushels of wheat and flour has been purchased by the U.S.S.R.

It is disclosed that the Soviet Union

has purchased some 40.4 million bushels of wheat from Argentina.

Aug. 16—The Soviet press publishes pictures of the far side of the moon taken in July by the spacecraft, Zond 3.

Aug. 25—*Krasnaya Zvezda* (defense ministry newspaper) publishes an article accusing the U.S. of using the Gemini 5 space flight to test the military aspects of space reconnaissance.

Aug. 27—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser arrives in Moscow for a 5-day state visit.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *U.S.S.R.* and *Yemen*)

UNITED STATES, THE

Civil Rights

Aug. 6—In Americus, Georgia, county officials appoint 3 Negroes to serve as deputy voting clerks. Some 300 Negro voters are registered. (See also *U.S., Government.*)

Aug. 8—Some 700 Ku Klux Klansmen and their supporters demonstrate in Americus; they march in silence and hold a memorial service for the white youth (an innocent bystander) shot on July 28 by Negroes one block from the courthouse where Negroes were holding a night vigil.

Aug. 13—In Watts, a predominantly Negro section of Los Angeles, California, rioting, looting, burning and killing continue for the third day. Almost 1,000 national guardsmen, armed with rifles and bayonets, are ordered to the area to help combat Negro snipers.

In Chicago, Illinois, a white policeman en route to work is attacked and stabbed by a crowd of Negroes. Last night Negroes rioted on Chicago's West Side after a fire truck hit and killed a Negro.

Aug. 14—Following another night of rioting in Chicago, in which 60 persons were injured, Governor Otto Kerner places 2,000 national guardsmen on stand-by alert.

President Lyndon B. Johnson calls the Los Angeles rioting "tragic and shocking." He orders Lee C. White, special counsel to the President, and LeRoy Collins, Under

Secretary of Commerce, to work with California Governor Edmund G. Brown in restoring order.

Aug. 16—After 5 days of riots, order is being restored to Los Angeles with the help of 15,000 national guard and police forces, most of whom have arrived in the area since August 13.

Calm is also restored at Long Beach, California, after racial incidents last night during which 1 policeman was killed and another wounded.

Aug. 17—In a Mississippi referendum, citizens vote in favor of a state constitutional amendment liquidating the state's voting qualification provisions that have served to exclude Negroes from voting lists.

Aug. 18—California Governor Brown announces that \$1.7 million in federal funds has been allocated to help restore the 4 square mile riot-torn sector of Los Angeles.

Massachusetts Governor John A. Volpe signs a bill making it illegal to maintain racially imbalanced public schools.

Aug. 20—In Hayneville, Alabama, civil rights worker Jonathan M. Daniels (a 26-year-old Episcopal seminarian) is shot and killed; a co-worker, Richard F. Morris (a Roman Catholic priest), is seriously wounded by the same white gunman.

Aug. 21—It is reported that in the 5-day Los Angeles race riot, 35 persons were killed and over 4,300 arrested.

Tom L. Coleman, a highway engineer and special deputy sheriff, is released on bail; he was charged yesterday with the murder of Jonathan Daniels in Hayneville.

Aug. 29—In Anniston, Alabama, a white man is charged with the shotgun murder of Negro Thad Christian last night.

Aug. 30—Many small cities and rural areas in the South open their formerly all-white schools to Negro children without incident.

Economy

Aug. 10—At a special news conference attended by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, it was announced that the U.S. showed a

plus of \$132 million in its balance of payments for the second quarter of 1965, the first such surplus since 1957.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 3—Addressing 200 members of the International Platform Association on the south lawn of the White House, President Johnson declares that both complete withdrawal and all-out war are unsatisfactory alternatives in Vietnam. He affirms the U.S. commitment to help South Vietnam "remain independent and free of aggression." (See also *Vietnam*.)

Aug. 4—Following a conference at the White House with President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk on his talks last month with Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman voices his opinion that the Soviet Union "sincerely wanted peace" in South Vietnam. However, he does not believe that the Soviet leaders will use their influence to mediate the conflict. Johnson also meets with the retiring Ambassador to South Vietnam, Maxwell Taylor.

Aug. 6—Ghana's Foreign Minister, Alex Quaison-Sackey, meets with President Johnson to deliver a letter from Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah on the results of talks between a Ghanaian mission and North Vietnamese officials.

Aug. 7—White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers discloses that President Johnson has denied yesterday's request from President Nkrumah to halt bombing attacks on North Vietnam temporarily.

Aug. 12—Martin Luther King declares that he will issue appeals to President Johnson, North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh, and Soviet, Chinese and South Vietnamese leaders to end the war in Vietnam.

Aug. 13—The U.S. government announces that it will withdraw its diplomatic staff from the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) because U.S. officials have been mistreated there.

Aug. 17—In a speech to Latin American ambassadors marking the 4th anniversary

of the signing of the Punta del Este Charter, President Johnson promises continued support for the social, political and economic goals of the Alliance for Progress.

Aug. 28—Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball leave for a 2-week visit to Europe's financial centers to discuss reform of the international monetary system.

Government

(See also *Civil Rights*)

Aug. 4—President Johnson signs a mental health bill providing money for staffing community mental health centers and for training teachers to work with handicapped children.

President Johnson asks Congress for an additional \$1.7 billion defense appropriation for fighting the war in Vietnam.

Aug. 5—The House and Senate pass a compromise bill providing \$185 million over a 5-year period for water desalinization projects.

Aug. 6—In the President's Room at the Capitol, President Johnson signs the Voting Rights Bill of 1965 (passed on August 4). The bill provides for the eradication of literacy tests if they are used to deny the right to vote to Negroes. In states and counties where less than 50 per cent of the eligible voters are registered, or voted in the 1964 election, "federal examiners will be sent in to register all eligible voters." The act also orders the U.S. Attorney General to institute law suits challenging the constitutionality of poll taxes in determining voter eligibility. Texas, Alabama, Mississippi and Virginia use the poll tax as a prerequisite to vote. President Johnson pledges immediate enforcement of this legislation.

Aug. 7—The Justice Department files suit to abolish the Mississippi state poll tax as a prerequisite for voting in state and local elections.

The Bureau of the Census and the Justice Department publish in the Federal Register a list of areas where less than 50 per cent of those eligible voted in the 1964

presidential election; in effect, this step brings about the suspension of literacy tests as a requirement for voting in 7 states and 29 counties.

Aug. 9—President Johnson signs a \$280 million health research bill, providing for construction of research facilities and increased federal funds for medical research. Johnson also announces plans to establish a White House study group on health, education and "happiness" goals. He discloses that U.S. Surgeon General Luther L. Terry will resign in September.

Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach names 9 counties in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana where federal examiners will be sent to register Negro voters starting tomorrow.

Aug. 10—President Johnson signs a \$7.5 billion housing program, including a provision for rent subsidies to low-income families renting in private nonprofit housing developments. The bill also provides for federal assistance for slum renewal and for grants to low-income families for property rehabilitation.

Aug. 13—Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, ending a 2-day tour of the East, declares that New York City and other drought-stricken areas are "walking on the edge of disaster."

Aug. 17—The House of Representatives approves a bill to create a national park at the proposed Tocks Island dam and reservoir on the upper Delaware River, to be known as the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area. The bill is sent to the President.

Aug. 18—The bill to create a national park on Ellis Island, as part of the Statue of Liberty National Monument, is signed by President Johnson.

President Johnson declares the Delaware Valley watershed and the communities it supplies in 4 eastern states a disaster area. Johnson also announces 3 federal projects to combat the drought.

Aug. 20—Hundreds of youths at a Job Corps center at Camp Breckinridge in Kentucky riot to protest against poor food.

T. Lamar Caudle, a high-ranking government official in the Truman Administration convicted of conspiring to defraud the government, receives a pardon from President Johnson.

Aug. 21—President Johnson signs a \$1 billion bill covering pay increases for the armed forces.

Johnson vetoes a \$1.7 billion bill for military construction purposes, claiming it violates the constitutional separation of powers.

Aug. 22—President Johnson names Charles Frankel, a philosophy professor, to serve as assistant secretary of state for education and cultural affairs; he replaces Harry Campbell McPherson, Jr., who will serve as a full-time special assistant and counsel to the President.

Aug. 23—President Johnson finds "heartening" a report by the Office of Education that all but 180 of the 25,000 school districts in the U.S. are willing to desegregate their schools to be eligible for federal assistance.

Aug. 24—The Senate approves a \$3.36 billion foreign aid authorization bill; it now goes to the White House.

Johnson signs a 1-year extension of the Peace Corps Act.

Aug. 25—At a news conference, Johnson announces that he has appointed 4 persons to serve at the U.N. under U.S. Representative Arthur Goldberg. Enjoying the rank of ambassador are Charles Yost, a Foreign Service officer; James M. Nabrit, Jr., president of Howard University; Eugene Anderson, a former Democratic national committeewoman; and James Roosevelt, congressman from California.

Aug. 27—President Johnson celebrates his 57th birthday.

Aug. 28—A White House statement announces a new project in the government's antipoverty program, in which 5.5 million elderly and needy persons will be recruited to work with retarded and neglected children and elderly bedridden persons.

Aug. 29—The Presidential Assistant for Congressional Relations, Lawrence F. O'Brien

is appointed Postmaster General. He succeeds John A. Gronouski, who will become U.S. ambassador to Poland.

Aug. 30—President Johnson orders government agencies not engaged in defense to reduce spending plans for the next fiscal year by almost \$9 billion.

Aug. 31—The House of Representatives completes congressional action on the bill to create a Department of Housing and Urban Development, its chief to have cabinet rank.

President Johnson announces that Project Head Start, a training program for needy preschool children, will operate on a yearly basis beginning this fall.

abor

Aug. 16—President Johnson asks Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz and President of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations George Meany to recommend by tomorrow "effective procedures" for ending the maritime strike that began on June 16, when the 8 member companies of the American Merchant Marine Institute were struck by the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association. President Johnson supports Wirtz's proposal that a 4-year contract covering conventional vessels be signed and a 6-month mediation period be allowed for settling the issue of automated vessels.

Aug. 17—The 63-day-old M.E.B.A. strike ends; the settlement follows the lines suggested by President Johnson with a mediation period set for settling the problem of manning automated vessels. Early agreement is expected by the 2 other striking maritime unions, the International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots and the American Radio Association.

Aug. 19—District I of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association approves a new contract to end the 65-day-old maritime strike; the engineers receive a 3.2 per cent wage increase each year for 4 years beginning in 1965.

Aug. 25—The president of the United Steelworkers of America, I. W. Abel, announces formally that the union has rejected indus-

try's offer of a 40-cent hourly increase in wages and fringe benefits over a 39-month period beginning May 1, 1965.

Aug. 26—President Johnson telephones Abel and the executive vice-president of the U.S. Steel Corp., R. Conrad Cooper, to urge them to cooperate to avoid a strike "in these troubled times."

Aug. 28—President Johnson appoints 2 special mediators to help negotiate a steel settlement: Senator Wayne Morse (Dem., Ore.) and LeRoy Collins (Under Secretary of Commerce).

Aug. 29—President Johnson announces, in a news conference, that an agreement in principle was reached early this morning between the 8 shipping companies and the 2 striking unions, the mates and radio men, ending the 75-day-old strike. The unions must ratify the pact.

Aug. 30—President Johnson announces that union and industry negotiators have agreed to an 8-day postponement of the steel strike originally scheduled for September 1.

Military

Aug. 3—The Defense Department announces that it has requested a 60 per cent increase in the draft quota for September, for a total of 27,400 men; in October it has requested a quota of 33,600 men. The increased quotas result from President Johnson's decision to send 50,000 more troops to Vietnam.

Aug. 14—It is announced that last night Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze signed orders for the compulsory extension by 4 months of the tours of duty for regular navy and marine corps personnel.

Aug. 21—The Gemini 5 spacecraft is orbited. It will test the effects of 8 days in space on 2 astronauts and also the feasibility of a rendezvous with another object in space.

Aug. 25—President Johnson, at a news conference, announces that he has authorized the Defense Department to begin work on a manned orbiting laboratory in which astronauts can work and sleep in everyday clothing.

Aug. 26—Johnson signs an executive order ending draft exempt status for all men married after midnight tonight.

Aug. 29—Lieutenant Colonel L. Gordon Cooper, Jr., and Lieutenant Commander Charles Conrad, Jr., successfully end their 8-day space flight with a splashdown in the Atlantic. The 2 astronauts are described as "in wonderful shape."

Politics

Aug. 12—Speaking at the annual dinner of the American Bar Association in Miami, Florida, Pennsylvania Governor William W. Scranton (Rep.) declares that the Republican party should not try to encompass "the radicals, the racists and their brethren."

Segregation

(See *Civil Rights*)

VIETNAM, NORTH

Aug. 21—A Hanoi radio broadcast declares that U.S. bombing attacks against North Vietnam have not blocked the economy from "developing and scoring great achievements."

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Aug. 2—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a news conference, declares that "the problem of peace [in Vietnam] rests with Hanoi."

Aug. 5—Major General Lewis W. Walt, marine commander, expresses regret over the deaths of 4 children and 1 woman during a marine offensive against Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebels, on August 2-3.

Aug. 7—According to a Hanoi radio program, the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (the political arm of the Vietcong rebel movement) has asked North Vietnam for assistance in repelling U.S. aggression.

Aug. 9—In an editorial in *Nhan* (official newspaper), North Vietnam declares that it is "ready to respond to this call" for help on the part of the National Liberation Front.

Aug. 13—Presidential press secretary Bill D.

Moyers discloses that President Johnson has directed Secretary Rusk to inform the International Committee of the Red Cross that the U.S. will respect the 1949 Geneva conventions on protection of war prisoner civilians and medical centers.

North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh in an interview in *Le Monde* (Paris newspaper), declares that any peace conference on Vietnam is conditional upon U.S. acceptance of Hanoi's 4-point program for settlement. (See *Vietnam*, July 7, *Current History*, September, 1965, p. 191.)

Aug. 25—It is reported that in Hué, student demonstrations continue for the 3rd day; the students demand a civilian government and denounce U.S. policies in Vietnam.

U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents his credentials to the chief of state Major General Nguyen Van Thieu and meets with Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

Aug. 26—*The New York Times* reports that third party emissaries, with proposals for slowing down the Vietnamese war, are being received by North Vietnam.

YEMEN

Aug. 13—Representatives of the Yemeni royalist and republican factions, meeting at Taif in Saudi Arabia, announce that they have agreed on a settlement of the 3-year-old civil war.

Aug. 22—U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser arrives in Saudi Arabia to confer with King Faisal on ending the Yemeni civil war, in which the U.A.R. has supported the republicans and Saudi Arabia the royalists.

Aug. 24—King Saud and President Nasser sign an agreement for ending the Yemeni civil war. It provides for an immediate ceasefire, for the withdrawal of U.A.R. troops from Yemen within 10 months, and for an end to Saudi Arabian support of the Yemeni royalists. A new coalition government is to be formed within 3 months.

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